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THE SYMBIOSIS BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND WAR:  
THE CASE OF ANCIENT ATHENS 
David M. Pritchard (University of Queensland) 
 
Introduction 
 
This edited collection significantly advances our understanding of the two-way 
relationship of causation between democracy and war in world history. In particular it 
explores the almost entirely neglected question of the impact of the democracy of the 
classical Athenians on their waging of war. Today ancient Athens is not widely 
known for its intensification and transformation of war-making among the Greeks. It 
is famous instead for what is arguably the most fully developed democracy of pre-
modern times and for its innovative culture, which helped lay the foundations for the 
arts, literature and sciences of the ancient and modern worlds. In 508/7 BC the 
Athenian dmos (‘people’) rose up against a leader who was once again aiming for 
tyranny, expelled him and the foreign troops backing his attempt, and arrested and 
executed his upper-class supporters (Ath. Pol. 20.1-21.2; Herodotus 5.65.5-74.1).1
They could no longer tolerate the internecine struggles of the elite and demanded an 
active role in the decision-making of the city. This was quickly realised by the 
reforms of Cleisthenes, which made the assembly and a new popular council of five-
hundred members the final arbiters of public actions and laws.2 By the early 450s the 
people had consolidated their new dmokratia (‘democracy’) by making decisions on 
an increasing range of public affairs and by taking over entirely the administration of 
justice and the oversight of magistrates (e.g. Ath. Pol. 25.1-26.2; Plutarch Cimon 
15.1-2).3 Admittedly Athenian leaders were still members of the upper class, 
struggling for pre-eminence with each other.4 Now, however, their rivalries were 
played out in agnes or political debates, with the final decision to support this or that 
politician resting with predominantly non-elite assembly goers and councillors.5 To 
win over such notoriously boisterous and censorious audiences, politicians were 
forced to negotiate and articulate the self-perceptions, norms and perceived interests 
of lower-class Athenians.6 Out of this dynamic of mass adjudicators and elite 
 
1 Forsdyke 2005, 133-42; Ober 1996; 32-52; 2007; Pritchard 2005a, 141-4. Contra Raaflaub 
1998a; 2007a.  
2 Hansen 1991, 33-6; Ostwald 1986, 15-28; Meier 1990, 53-81. 
3 Hansen 1991, 36-8; Pritchard 1994, 133-5. 
4 For the social background of Athenian leaders, see, for example, Ober 1989, 104-26. 
5 For this performance dynamic and its concomitant popular culture, see Ober 2000; Pelling 
2000, 1-17; Pritchard 1998a, 38-44; Roisman 2005, 3-6. 
6 E.g. Aeschylus Suppliant Women 483; Aristophanes Acharnians 37-9; Plato Republic 492b-
c. Hansen 1991, 146-7; Tacon 2001.  
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performers in competition with each other emerged a strong popular culture, which 
supported the liberty and political capability of every citizen, the rule of law and the 
open debating of policies and ideas.7
We now know several other Greek poleis (‘city-states’) experimented with 
popular government in the course of the sixth century.8 Thus the invention of 
democracy can no longer be attributed to Athens.9 However, in contrast to the other 
democracies of the Greek world the Athenian example avoided the stasis or civil 
strife, which destroyed so many others and, with the exception of short periods of 
oligarchy in 411 and 404, enjoyed two centuries of continuous operation.10 In 
addition the Athenian democracy handled a significantly larger amount of public 
business, while its strong budgetary position meant it could spend around 100 talents 
per annum on pay for assembly goers, councillors, jurors and magistrates, which 
allowed a wider social spectrum of citizens to be politically active.11 As a 
 
7 For the detailed popular ideology of Athenian democracy, see Balot 2006, 48-85; Brock 
1991; Raaflaub 1989; Robinson 1997, 45-62. This chapter employs terms such as ‘the upper class’ 
and ‘the lower class’ and other pairs describing vertical social differentiation strictly as synonyms 
for ‘the wealthy’ and ‘the poor’. Although classical Athenians had a variety of ways for dividing up 
the citizen-body practically and conceptually, the one which was used most often was between hoi
plousioi (‘the wealthy’) and hoi penetes (‘the poor’). Surviving comedy and public oratory assume 
that the first of these social classes was marked out primarily by their lives of skhol (‘leisure’) and 
hence their lack of the need to work, distinctive clothing and footwear, particular but not always 
highly esteemed attitudes and actions, and exclusive pastimes, such as athletics, hunting, 
horsemanship, pederastic homosexuality and mannered drinking parties. Their lifestyle, liturgies 
and other significant contributions to public life made them conspicuous amongst the city’s 
residents. The classical Athenians classed the rest of the citizen-body, from the truly destitute to 
those sitting just below the upper class, as ‘the poor’. Classical sources suggest that what the varied 
members of this second social class had in common was the requirement to work and a way of life 
that was frugal and moderate. See especially Gabrielsen 1994, 43-73; Markle 1985, 266-71; 
Prichard 1999a, 51-63; 2004, 212-3; Rosivach 1991; 2001; Vartsos 1978 – all with primary sources.  
8 Keane 2009, 90-5; Robinson 1997, 65-122. The reliability of the surviving evidence for 
political arrangements in half of the 17 early democracies which Robinson identifies has been called 
into question (Hansen 1999).  
9 But its invention can still be attributed to the Greeks, for while there have long been 
attempts to push democracy back to the Levant and Mesopotamia (e.g. Isakhan 2007; Jacobsen 
1943; 1957; Keane 2007, 101-26), they founder for want of evidence for the broad membership and 
political preeminence of the assemblies in these early city-state cultures (e.g. Barjamovic 2004; 
Cartledge 2009, 55-6; Robinson 1997, 16-25).  
10 For the other democracies of classical Greece, see O’Neal 1995. For the ubiquity of violent 
regime-change as a result of civil strife and foreign intervention, see Hansen 2006a, 125-6; Hansen 
and Nielsen 2004, 124-9; and especially Gehrke 1985.  
11 For studies of political participation in classical Athens, see, for example, Phillips 1981; 
Sinclair 1988. Hansen costs the democracy’s honorary decrees and its payment of assembly goers, 
councillors and jurors at 92 to 112 t. per year in the 330s (1991, 98, 150, 189, 241, 254-5, 315-6). 
There had been pay for the city magistrates in the later fifth century until the oligarchic regime of 
411 stopped this practice (e.g. Ath. Pol. 29.5; Pseudo-Xenophon 1.13; Thucydides 8.56.3, 67.3). 
Since the surviving sources from the late fifth century onwards do not mention the restoration of 
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consequence the ideological and practical development of the Athenian democracy 
was very much fuller than any other of pre-modern times. Indeed no subsequent 
democracy has ever enjoyed the same extraordinary levels of engagement and 
participation among its citizens.12 For example, the frequent assembly-meetings of 
classical Athens were attended by several thousand, while in the fourth century two 
thirds of the city’s 30,000 citizens willingly served for one or two years on the 
Council of Five Hundred.13 Not without reason Athens has been an inspiration for 
modern democrats since the nineteenth century.14 George Grote and other leading 
liberals of Victorian England assiduously employed this example of a prosperous and 
stable democracy to build political support for extending the right to vote.15 Athens 
today is celebrated as the ancient predecessor of our democracies and its participatory 
politics increasingly studied for new ways to address current political challenges. 
 Classical Athens was also the leading cultural centre of the Greek world. The 
disciplines of the visual arts, oratory, drama and literature were developed to a far 
higher level of quality in this city than any other, with many of the works produced 
there becoming canonical for Graeco-Roman antiquity. Admittedly these innovations 
were dependent on the extraordinary wealth of classical Athens and its upper class 
and the ability of both to spend significant sums on festival-based agnes or contests 
and publicly displayed art. Between 430 and 350 khorgoi (‘chorus-sponsors’) and 
the city’s magistrates, for example, spent a total of 29 talents on each celebration of 
the City Dionysia, while public and private spending on the full program of polis-
based festivals probably added up to 100 talents per year.16 But ever since Johann 
Winckelmann – the eighteenth-century founder of Classical Archaeology – this so-
called cultural revolution has been interpreted primarily as the product of Athenian 
 
pay for magistrates, Hansen plausibly concludes that they did not receive a misthos in the 330s (e.g. 
Hansen 1991, 240-1; contra Gabrielsen 1981). A century earlier Athens may not have provided pay 
for assembly goers, which was introduced only around 400 (Loomis 1998, 20-2), but this was offset 
by the sizeable salary bill for magistrates, whose number had grown enormous to meet the 
administrative tasks of the empire. At this time there were probably 700 magistrates at home and 
the same number again working overseas (Ath. Pol. 24.3 with Hansen 1980 and Meiggs 1972, 215). 
Therefore around 430 the running costs of the democracy were probably not significantly lower 
than what they would be a century later (Kallet 1998, 46).  
12 Hansen 1992, 24.  
13 For participation in the assembly and its near-weekly meetings, see Hansen 1991, 124-36. 
For participation in the council and the volunteering of individual citizens to be candidates in the 
sortition of councillors from their deme, see Lysias 31.5, 33; Hansen 1991, 247-8; Pritchard 2004a, 
210 n.9; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, xvii.  
14 Dawson 1995; Hansen 1992; Rhodes 2003, 29-33: Vidal-Naquet 2000.  
15 Dawson 2000; Keane 2009, 84-8; Ober 2008a, 67-70; Roberts 1994, 231-55; and especially 
Demetriou 1999, 1-159. 
16 For these cost-estimates of the City Dionysia and the festival program, see Wilson 2008 and 
Pritchard 2010 respectively.  
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democracy.17 Certainly the new requirement for elite poets, politicians and litigants to 
compete for the favour of mass audiences drove rapid innovations in oratory and 
drama.18 For example, the celebrated plays of Athens were performed in front of 
thousands of citizens at festival-based contests. While the eponymous archon selected 
and paid the poets, the training and costuming of the performers were the 
responsibility of chorus sponsors (e.g. Ath. Pol. 56.3).19 These elite citizens had a 
great deal riding on the performance of their choruses.20 Victory translated into 
political influence and support, while the generous financing of choruses could be 
canvassed during legal trials to help win over lower-class jurors.21 For the sake of 
their careers poets too wanted to be victorious (e.g. Aristophanes Wasps 1043-50). 
Although the judging of choral contests was formally in the hands of magistrates, 
they were guided by the vocal and physically active responses of the largely lower-
class theatre goers (e.g. Aristophanes Birds 444-7; Frogs 771-80; Plato Laws 659a-c, 
700a-1b).22 Since the regular attendance of ordinary citizens at dramatic and choral 
agnes continually enhanced their appreciation of the different forms of performance, 
sponsors and poets found a competitive advantage by pushing the boundaries of the 
genre, whether it be tragedy, comedy, satyric drama or dithyramb.23 
This common dynamic of mass adjudicators and elite performers in competition 
did not constrain Athenian historians, philosophers and treatise-writers of the later 
fifth and fourth centuries, who wrote only for upper-class readers. Therefore they 
were free to express anti-democratic biases and elite preoccupations.24 However, we 
now have a better understanding of how their works were critical responses to the 
democracy, shared some of its ideological assumptions and were facilitated in part by 
 
17 E.g. Boedeker and Raaflaub 1998b; 1998c; de Romilly 1996; Despotopoulos 1996; Dawson 
1995, 4-5; Ober 2008a, 81-2. Contra Samons 2001.  
18 For the impact of this performance dynamic on oratorical practice in fifth-century Athens, 
see Yunis 1998, especially 228-32. Yunis writes (231): ‘Where so much daily depended on 
competitive speechmaking before mass audiences of average, anonymous citizens;…and where, 
finally, politicians and litigants had such enormous incentive to find the best way of putting their 
case and the need for efficient public communication was becoming distressingly obvious – here the 
conditions that would favor the development of rhetoric were all in place. This was a new situation.’   
19 Wilson 2000, 50-101.  
20 Ober 1989, 231-3; Wilson 2000, 109-97.  
21 For the political advantages, see, for example, Plutarch Nicias 3.1-3. For so-called festival 
liturgies as a plus in legal proceedings, see, for example, Lysias 3.46, 12.38, 18.23, 20.31, 21.1-6, 
25.12-13, 30.1.  
22 Csapo and Slater 1995, 301-5; Wallace 1997, 98-106. 
23 Revermann 2006, especially 113-15. For the competition-driven innovations of each of 
these four genres, see Burian 1997, 206; Bremer 1993, 160-5; Seaford 1984, 44; Zimmermann 
1996, 53-4 respectively.  
24 Ober 1989, 43-52; 2008a, 78-9; Pritchard 1998a, 40.  
Page 5 
 
its championing of personal liberty and open debate.25 Finally the visual arts of 
classical Athens greatly influenced the artists and architects of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, while echoes of its surviving literature continue to resound in 
our own cultures today.26 
Certainly never praised and not widely known is the contemporaneous military 
revolution.27 During the fifth century Athens ‘widened, amplified, and intensified’ the 
waging of war, regularly attacked other democracies and was ‘a constant source of 
death and destruction’ among the Greeks.28 More than any other polis this city 
invented or perfected new forms of combat, strategy and military organisation and 
was directly responsible for raising the scale and destructiveness of Greek warfare to 
a different order of magnitude. In so doing the Athenian dmos overcame popular 
prejudices which elsewhere tended to stifle military innovations. By the time its 
dmokratia was consolidated Athens was the dominant military power in the eastern 
Mediterranean and had long moved large forces over hundreds of kilometres for 
campaigns which lasted months or, in the case of sieges, up to a few years.29 War 
now dominated the politics of the city and the lives of thousands of upper- and lower-
class citizens. Foreign policy was the mainstay of political debate, with war and 
peace being a compulsory item on the agenda of the kuria ekklsia or main assembly-
meeting of each prytany (Ath. Pol. 43.4; Aristophanes Acharnians 19-27).30 Fifth-
century Athenians waged war more frequently than ever before: they launched one or 
more campaigns in two out of three years on average and never enjoyed peace for 
more than a decade.31 They also directed more public money to war than to all other 
polis-activities combined, spending, for example, between 500 and 2000 talents per 
year on their armed forces during the Peloponnesian War.32 By the 450s military 
service was also perceived as the duty of every citizen, which the Athenian dmos 
appears to have taken very seriously.33 They passed laws stripping political rights 
from those found guilty of draft-dodging or desertion (e.g. Aristophanes Knights 443; 
Wasps 1117-21; Pseudo-Xenophon 3.5), conscripted whole swathes of the citizen-
 
25 Ober 1998a; Roberts 1994, 71-96; Rowe 1998. 
26 Greenhalgh 1998, 317-23; Hardwick 2003.  
27 Eyres 2006.  
28 Quotations from Hanson 2001, 4, 24. For the lack of a so-called democratic peace between 
the democracies of fifth-century Greece, see Robinson 2001; 2006 pace Russett and Antholis 1992; 
Weart 2001.  
29 Raaflaub 1999, 141-4.  
30 Hansen 1991, 133; Raaflaub 2001, 319.  
31 Garlan 1995, 53; Raaflaub 1999, 141; Russett and Antholis 1992, 427.  
32 Pritchard 2010. 
33 E.g. Aeschylus Seven against Thebes 10-20; cf. 415-16; Euripides Children of Heracles 
824-7; Thucydides 1.144.4, 2.41.5, 2.43.1.  
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body, on several occasions, to man the ships (e.g. Thucydides 3.16.1, 17.1-3; 7.16.1; 
Xenophon Hellenica 2.6.24-5) or march against a neighbouring city (e.g. Thucydides 
2.31.1-3; 4.90.1, 94.1-2) and continued to accept the high numbers of citizens which 
were regularly killed in action.34 For example, in 460/59 one of the city’s ten tribal 
subdivisions lost 177 members in battles by land and sea in mainland Greece, Cyprus, 
Egypt and Phoenicia (IG I3 1147; cf. 1147bis). Even more extraordinary is the impact 
of the Peloponnesian War and the plague during its early years on Athenian 
demography: in 431 there were most probably 60,000 citizens living in Attica, but, 
after twenty-five years, only 25,000 adult citizens were left.35 
This chapter analyses this military revolution of fifth-century Athens and 
evaluates what contributions this edited collection makes to our understanding of the 
symbiosis between democracy and war in world history. It divides into eight parts. 
Part one studies the character of Athenian war-making in the century before the 
democracy to set benchmarks against which the military changes of the fifth century 
can be measured. Part two canvasses the post-508/7 increases in the scale and 
frequency of Athens’ campaigns and the participation-rate of its citizens as soldiers. 
In addition this part clarifies what was innovative about the numerous military 
reforms of fifth-century Athens and identifies as two major causes of its military 
revolution the large public income from the Athenian Empire and the demographic 
advantage which the city had over its rivals. Part three explains that although there is 
a prima facie case that democracy is the third major cause of this revolution in 
military affairs, disciplinary and cultural factors have discouraged sustained analysis 
of democracy’s impact on war.  
 The next two parts of this chapter make clear how the collection as a whole 
suggests that the democracy of classical Athens affected its war-making in a pair of 
divergent ways. Part four details how the dynamic of mass adjudicators and elite 
performers in competition led to a pronounced militarism, which encouraged lower-
class Athenians to be soldiers in larger numbers and to start wars much more 
frequently. But part five explains how the foreign-policy risks of this pro-war culture 
were reduced by the open debating of proposals for war, which also facilitated 
military innovations and efficiency and helped develop the initiative of the Athenians 
on the battlefield. Part six employs the military record of fourth-century Athens to 
determine the importance of democracy relative to the two other major causes of the 
of the previous century’s revolution in military affairs. Part seven acknowledges the 
 
34 For these laws, see Balot 2004a, 419; Hamel 1998a; Pritchard 1999a, 84-6. For the 
conscription of large numbers of citizens, including the lowest of the four Solonian tel, in such 
military emergencies, see Gabrielsen 2002a, 206-8.  
35 Hansen 1988, 14-28; cf. Akrigg 2008, 29-33.  
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limits of this volume’s treatment of the impact of military affairs on Athenian 
democratisation and, in light of the collapse of our longstanding understanding of this 
relationship, proposes new directions for research into the causes of democracy’s 
emergence and consolidation in ancient Athens. Part eight, finally, canvasses the 
value of ancient Athens as a case study for political scientists and policymakers. In 
particular it spells out how explanations of Athenian foreign policy can help identify 
underlying assumptions about contemporary democracy and the waging of war and 
suggest new ways for thinking about their interaction.  
 
1. Athenian War-Making before Democracy 
 
The intense and innovative warfare of fifth-century Athens represented a 
qualitative change from the city’s past military record. The traditional oration which 
was delivered at the public funeral for the fallen soldiers of the classical period made 
out that the Athenians had waged war with the same intensity and modus operandi 
from the age of the heroes to the present.36 In reality nothing could have been further 
from the truth: before the late-sixth-century reforms of Cleisthenes, Athens did not 
have a publicly controlled army or any institutional means for mobilising soldiers, 
while the small numbers of Athenians who bothered to march out for battle did so 
very infrequently. Admittedly the military ventures and public events of archaic 
Athens are poorly documented because knowledge of them was only conveyed by 
word of mouth for around a century before Herodotus and Thucydides wrote 
elements of these oral traditions down. While private individuals and families had 
good reason to recall past wars as proof, for example, of ancestral courage, much 
tends to be lost in this oral transmission of history from one generation to the next.37 
Nevertheless it does seem significant that from the attempted coup of Cylon, in the 
later seventh century, to the assassination of Hipparchus, in 514/3, we know of less 
than twelve recorded campaigns.38 ‘This catalogue of Athenian military ventures,’ 
Frank Frost concludes, ‘for a period of something over a century is surprisingly 
modest for a people who were supposed to have been so fond of fighting and for 
 
36 For analysis of this common feature of the genre, see Loraux 1986, 132-71; Pritchard 1996, 
148; 1999a, 25-6 – all with ancient testimonia.  
37 For this fragility of oral tradition, see Thomas 1989, especially 123-30.  
38 For the testimonia of these ventures, see Frost 1984; Sealey 1976, 140-5. My tally counts 
the coups of Cylon and Pisistratus, in 546/5, as two ventures each. Pace Frost (1984, 291) I believe 
the Pisistratids involved citizen hoplites in their campaigns until 514/3 (see below). Thus I include 
their campaigns against Sigeion (Herodotus 5.94-5) and Naxos (1.64.2; Ath. Pol. 15.3) but not those 
against the Spartans and Alcmeonids after the assassination of Hipparchus (Herodotus 5.62-3).   
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whom the evolution of hoplite tactics was supposed to have been so politically 
significant’.39 
War does not seem to have dominated public life in sixth-century Athens. What 
campaigns there were usually had a limited goal: the winning of new agricultural land 
either on the borders of Attica (e.g. Ath. Pol. 14.1; Herodotus 1.59.4, 139.2) or in 
colonies overseas (e.g. Herodotus 6.36). A good example of this limited style of war-
making is the venture which Solon led to take the island of Salamis from 
neighbouring city of Megara.40 He rekindled Athenian interest in do so by performing 
a ‘nationalist’ poem in the city’s marketplace and promised its land to those wishing 
to volunteer for the campaign (Plutarch Solon 9.2). Five-hundred Athenians did come 
forward, with the portion charged with capturing the island’s settlement fitting on one 
ship (9.3). The same type of war-making was waged by the other mainland cities of 
sixth-century Greece.41 They went to war infrequently and for the sake of contested 
border land. Their campaigns took days or weeks to decide, were normally settled by 
a solitary clash of hoplite phalanxes and, due to a lack of military capacity, usually 
did not result in the subjugation, occupation or taxation of the defeated city.42 Indeed 
even in the classical period those cities which did not aspire to be regional or imperial 
powers, such as Athens, Sparta and Thebes, persisted with this limited style of land 
warfare.43 
Before Cleisthenes the military campaigns of Athens were not initiated or 
supervised by the city’s rudimentary political institutions nor led by leaders who had 
been publicly appointed.44 During the first tyranny of Pisistratus in 561/0, for 
example, Miltiades, the son of Cypselus, accepted the invitation of some Thracians of 
the Chersonese to lead them in their wars against their neighbours (Herodotus 6.34-
7).45 Once he had done so, however, he did not consult with the city’s Council of the 
Areopagus or tyrant nor seek appointment as a general or the city’s polemarkhos 
39 Quotation from Frost 1984, 292. 
40 See Demosthenes 19.252; Diogenes Laertius 1.46-8; Polyaenus 1.20.1-2; Pausanias 1.40.4; 
Plutarch Solon 8-10. Along with Frost (1984, 289), I prefer the more detailed version of the actual 
fighting for the island at Plutarch Solon 9.2-10.1 to the other involving youths cross-dressing (8.4-6; 
Polyaenus 1.20.2).  
41 For good general descriptions of archaic warfare, see Hanson 2001, 5-7; Raaflaub 1999, 
134-8. The territorial goal of traditional Greek warfare is best established by de Sainte Croix 1972, 
218-20; Hanson 2000, 214-18; van Wees 2004, 28-30  – all with ancient testimonia.   
42 The exception is archaic Sparta, which reduced the defeated Messenians to a state of 
slavery (Cartledge 2001a, 299-307 for the ancient testimonia) and turned itself into an armed camp 
to maintain their subjugation (see especially Finley 1968). Cf. van Wees 2003; 2004, 28-33.  
43 Connor 1988, 6-8; Garlan 1995, 55.    
44 Van Effenterre 1976, 4.  
45 Frost 1984, 291; de Souza 1998, 285-6; Gabrielsen 2007, 254-5.  
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(‘war-leader’).46 Instead Miltiades sought personal reassurance from the Delphic 
oracle that he should become the tyrant of these Thracians and, ‘having gathered 
together everyone of the Athenians who wished to be part of the naval expedition’ 
(6.36.1), simply sailed to the Chersonese where he and his relatives conducted wars 
for two generations as they saw fit (1.136.2-3; 6.35.2-41; Pausanias 6.19.6). Miltiades 
and the other Athenians who initiated and led naval expeditions appear to have relied 
on the standard fifty-oared ships of the period, which were frequently painted on 
Attic pots and which individual aristocrats privately maintained in order to compete 
in overseas games, visit guest friends, engage in trade and initiate or join overseas 
military ventures (cf. Herodotus 5.41, 47; 8.17).47 Vincent Gabrielsen puts it beyond 
doubt that the older view that Athens of the sixth century had a publicly controlled 
navy must now be ‘abandoned altogether’.48 According to this view, Attica was 
divided into forty-eight naukrariai or so-called ship-providing districts, in each of 
which wealthy men serving as naukrakoi supplied and commanded a warship for the 
city.49 But Gabrielsen explains how the association of naukrariai and ships only 
appears in lexicographers from the second century of our era and is probably based 
on their false inference that the term’s prefix can only signify a naus or warship (e.g. 
Pollux 8.108). By contrast, Athenian writers of the classical period believed the 
naukrakoi to be financial magistrates of one kind or another and never linked them or 
the funds which they managed to the navy (Ath. Pol. 8.3, 21.5; Herodotus 5.71.2).  
 The employment of volunteer soldiers in these expeditions of Miltiades and 
Solon could be put down to their essentially discretionary character: they were 
acquisitive rather than defensive and hence the city was under no pressure to raise 
adequate forces quickly. But such an interpretation is ruled out by the decidedly 
ineffectual responses of archaic Athenians to actual invasions of their territory, which 
suggest that Athens before the democracy simply lacked an institutional mechanism 
 
46 For the ad hoc recognition of individual aristocrats as the commanders of military ventures 
before the creation of the magisterial board of generals in 501/0, see Anderson 2003, 149-50; 
Ostwald 1986, 22 n.72; Rhodes 1981, 264-5 with bibliography. While classical-period writers 
assumed the polemarch was one of the city’s oldest magistracies (e.g. Ath. Pol. 3.2; Thucydides 
1.126.8), surviving sources shed no light on what roles he may have played in the campaigns of the 
sixth century (Gabrielsen 2007, 251; Singor 2000, 109). At the battle of Marathon, in 490, the 
polemarch served bravely, but the real commanders of the army were the board of generals 
(Herodotus 6.109-111, 114; Ath. Pol. 22.2; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, no. 18; Hamel 1998b, 79-83). 
Much later his duties were confined to religious and legal affairs (Ath. Pol. 58).  
47 Gabrielsen 1994, 24-6; 2008, 57; Haas 1985, 39-41; Humphreys 1978, 166-8; Morrison and 
Williams 1968, 73-117.  
48 Gabrielsen 1985; 1994, 19-24. Quotation from Gabrielsen 1994, 20. Contra Van Wees 
2004, 96, 203-4, 305 nn.4-8.  
49 E.g. Rhodes 1981, 151-2 with bibliography. 
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for mustering soldiers in any circumstances.50 The Athenian aristocrat Cylon, for 
example, some years after his victory at the Olympics of 640, endeavoured to 
establish himself as tyrant (Herodotus 5.70.1; Plutarch Solon 12.1-9; Thucydides 
1.126).51 With a small force of Megarians and ‘friends’ he invaded Attica and seized 
the Acropolis unopposed (Thucydides 1.126.5). Learning of this, Thucydides writes, 
the Athenians came to the rescue pandmei or in full force (7-8), which has 
understandably been interpreted as a formal mobilisation.52 After all, Thucydides and 
Xenophon do employ this adverb or panstratriai to describe those mobilisations of 
the fifth century in which Athenian generals compelled the regular corps of the armed 
forces and all other able bodied men to take part in the invasion of neighbouring 
territories (e.g. Thucydides 1.105.5-6; 2.31.1, 3; 4.90.1, 94.1-2; Xenophon Hellenica 
1.1.33-4).53 At 1.126.7, however, as he also clearly does in the previous chapter, 
Thucydides is not using pandmei in this sense: those who brought aid in response to 
Cylon’s taking of the Acropolis were simply the Athenians in the surrounding fields 
who had independently decided to oppose the would-be tyrant. In addition 
Thucydides tells us that they quickly tired of the siege’s toils, leaving it to the city’s 
archons to complete (7-12). The siege ended of course in sacrilege: in spite of a 
promise of safety, the besiegers executed Cylon’s soldiers after they had surrendered, 
including those who had taken sanctuary at an altar on the way down from the 
Acropolis. ‘The Alcmeonids and their sustasitai or partisans’, Herodotus confirms, 
were held ‘responsible for this slaughter’ (5.70.2; cf. Thucydides 1.127), which 
suggests that the leader of this aristocratic faction, Megacles, who was most probably 
the eponymous archon at the time (Plutarch Solon 12.1), was forced to rely on his 
family-members, other upper-class supporters and lower-class dependents for the 
necessary manpower to carry on with the siege.54 Nearly a century later, in 546/5, the 
Athenians responded no more effectively when Pisistratus made his third attempt at 
tyranny (Ath. Pol. 15.2, 17.4; Herodotus 1.61-2, 64).55 Against him, Herodotus writes 
(1.62.3), they marched out panstratii (‘with the whole army’), but his narrative 
confirms that this, again, was not a formal mobilisation: the Athenians let Pisistratus 
and his sons stay at Marathon long enough for them to marshal a formidable force, 
only mobilising when the would-be tyrant and his army began to move towards the 
city (2). The Athenians who joined in the defence came not from across Attica but 
 
50 Anderson 2003, 149; Frost 1984, 293-4.  
51 Frost 1984, 286-7; Lavelle 2005, 36-41; Rhodes 1981, 79-84, 151-2; Singor 2000, 111.  
52 E.g. Ober 2008b, 56, 58; van Wees 2008, 22-5.  
53 Van Wees 2006, 373-4.   
54 Frost 1984, 286-7.  
55 Frost 1984, 291; Lavelle 2005, 134-54.  
Page 11 
 
only ‘from the city’ (1.62.2, 63.1) and, as they fled in panic after little fighting 
(1.63.1-64.3), were most probably considerably smaller than Pisistratus’ force, which 
possibly numbered up to 5000.56 That the Alcmeonids immediately went into 
voluntary exile suggests that they alone had taken the initiative in trying to stop a 
rival aiming for tyranny (1.64.3; 6.123; cf. Isocrates 16.25-6). 
 This picture of privately raised armies parallels what else we know of public life 
in sixth-century Athens.57 Before 508/7 the Athenian assembly is attested to have met 
only once (Ath. Pol. 14.1; Herodotus 1.59.4-5) and to have had only two minor 
political functions: the election of magistrates and the review of their performance 
(Aristotle Politics 1274a16-17).58 Instead politics consisted largely of a contest 
between the leaders of two or three elite factions for acknowledged preeminence, 
which only rarely drew in lower-class Athenians. While leaders certainly got ahead 
by winning magistracies for themselves or their relatives and other upper-class 
supporters, their rivalry was pursued in the main outside of the formal institutions of 
government. They sought distinction among their peers through conspicuous 
consumption in the form of religious dedications, family tombs and chariot-racing 
(e.g. Herodotus 6.35-6, 103; Thucydides 1.126.3), through the provision of public 
sacrifices as the head of a genos and other religious benefactions, especially in 
relation to their city-protecting deity, Athena Polias, and, finally, through the 
performance of megala erga (‘great deeds’) as leaders in war (e.g. Herodotus 1.30, 
59).59 At times they negotiated private alliances between each other, often sealing 
them with marriages of convenience (e.g. 1.61). As the struggle to be first was not 
adjudicated by the dmos or any other third party and the city lacked any neutral 
armed force to prevent contenders resorting to violence, this could be a high-stakes 
contest, which regularly resulted in the covert murder of rivals, attempts to become a 
tyrant and the expulsion of one or another leader and his clan from the city.60 
This style of politics eventually broke down with Pisistratus’ definitive defeat of 
his rivals in 546/5, which allowed him to firmly establish tyranny for himself and his 
sons. They now monopolised the waging of war and taxed the Athenians to help pay 
for mercenaries, including Scythian archers and Thracian peltasts, whom they 
 
56 Lavelle 2005, 139-42.  
57 See Anderson 2003, 43-84, especially 67-74; Forsdyke 2005, 79-143; Frost 1981; Osborne 
1996, 215-25; Pritchard 1994, 114-18; 2005a. 
58 Anderson 2003, 59, 63, 234-5 n.30.  
59 In archaic Athens the genos was not a ‘clan’ or ‘faction’ but a small descent group, such as 
the Eumolpidai of the Eleusinian Mysteries, which was recognised for its privileged connection to a 
local cult to which it provided sacred personnel (Bourriot 1976, especially 1367-85; Kearns 1985, 
205-7).  
60 Anderson 2003, 150; Forsdyke 2005, 80-100; Singor 2000, 108; van Wees 2008.  
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employed on their campaigns (Thucydides 6.54.5-6).61 But they did not prevent 
individual Athenian hoplites from joining their expeditions and, on one occasion at 
least, gave the go ahead for an Athenian outside of their family to lead an overseas 
expedition (Herodotus 6.39-41). Aristotle’s suggestion that Pisistratus disarmed the 
city’s small number of hoplites immediately after his final return is clearly unreliable 
(Ath. Pol. 15.3-4): it contains anachronisms and contradicts earlier literary and 
archaeological evidence.62 However, the tyrants apparently did little to improve the 
city’s military efficiency or capacity, because, in 508/7, two years after their 
expulsion, the Athenians could not prevent King Cleomenes, who had ‘no great 
force’ (5.72.1), from invading Attica and taking the Acropolis and, once they had 
managed to force him to leave, quickly sought a military alliance with Persia out of a 
sense of vulnerability to the reprisals from Sparta which they anticipated (5.72-3).63 
The phalanxes of Athens before the democracy were small. The limited 
objectives and results of campaigns and the reliance on volunteers point to armies of 
hundreds rather than thousands of hoplites (Plutarch Solon 7.3; Thucydides 6.56.2, 
58.1-2).64 Since the main goal of archaic warfare was to capture new agricultural 
land, some of these volunteers were probably non-elite Athenians who were seeking 
to improve their personal circumstances. Nonetheless upper-class Athenians of the 
period were no less acquisitive than the lower class, could easily afford hoplite 
weapons and armour and were under the strongest moral and social pressure to be 
soldiers.65 It was through constantly bearing toils, dangers and expense in the agn of 
battle or sport and especially gaining victory that an archaic aristocrat proved his 
 
61 Gabrielsen 2007, 254; Pritchard 1999a, 133-4; Singor 2000, 115-19 pace Frost 1984, 291; 
van Effenterre 1976, 3-4. For the tyrants’ hiring of Scythian archers and Thracian peltasts, see Vos 
1963, 70-80 and Best 1969 respectively. 
62 For several reasons Aristotle’s suggestion that Pisistratus deprived the Athenian hoplites of 
their weapons by stealth during a city-wide ‘military review’ in the sanctuary of Theseus in 546/5 
must be rejected (Ath. Pol. 15.3-4). Firstly, the existence of such a mechanism for mustering troops 
is improbable in light of the otherwise disorganised nature of Athenian warfare in this period. 
Secondly, this sanctuary was built only after the Persian Wars (Rhodes 1981, 210-11). Thirdly, 
Aristotle directly contradicts Thucydides 6.56.2 and 6.58.1-2 where Hippias uses a very similar ruse 
to disarm hoplites in 514/3. Fourthly, we have numerous Athenian pots of the second half of the 
sixth century with images of contemporary hoplites and horsemen (e.g. Lissarrague 1990). The 
popularity of such images is not easy to explain if Pisistratus had disarmed the Athenians. Finally 
there is a black-figure cup of 550 or thereabouts in the private collection of Stavros Niarchos (inv. 
no. A31; Bérard 1989, 108 fig. 152). Among the participants of the Panathenaic procession which it 
depicts are three hoplites (Shear 2001, 128-9, 155-6).  
63 Forsdyke 2005, 139; van Effenterre 1976, 4. 
64 Foxhall 1997, 131; Singor 2000, 110.  
65 Solon complained of elite acquisitiveness and introduced reforms to moderate it (Balot 
2001, 73-98). For this strong obligation for the elite to be soldiers, see Dickie 1984, 250; Gabrielsen 
1994, 25-6; 2002b, 87; van Wees 2004, 37-45, 55-60.  
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aret or courage (e.g. Pindar Olympian 6.9; cf. 10.91). Thus a majority of Athenian 
hoplites probably belonged to the upper class, which on the basis of analogy with the 
classical period would have numbered no more than 5 percent of free males.66 Indeed 
Henk Singor concludes from his research on the pre-classical phalanx that ‘the 
typical hoplites of archaic Greece’ were ‘generally those belonging to the elite of 
society’.67 This small number of Athenian hoplites and the apparent infrequency of 
the military ventures which sixth-century Athens initiated call into question the 
traditional explanation of democracy as the outgrowth of a massive expansion in the 
number of non-elite soldiers in the city’s army (see part 7 below).  
 How the aristocrats of sixth-century Athens represented their activities as 
hoplites can be seen in the imagery on archaic black- and red-figure pottery and in 
their ostentatious burials. While the finely painted pots of the period were no doubt 
consumed by elite and non-elite Athenians, their pictures evoked the social milieu 
and outlook of the upper class.68 Military scenes on such vessels, dating from the 
mid-sixth to the early-fifth centuries, have been superbly analysed by François 
Lissarrague.69 They show how elite Athenians articulated age, gender and social 
distinctions around the norm of the heavily armed soldier and employed the values 
and commonplaces of epic poetry to represent their own martial deeds.70 A good 
example of this epic influence concerns the scenes of a hoplite killed in action or his 
corpse being carried back to the city.71 Homeric heroes succinctly explain how they 
will gain everlasting renown and eternal memory of their youthfulness by dying 
bravely in battle (e.g. Homer Iliad 12.318-28; 22.71-3, 304-5; cf. 22.362-4).72 By his 
‘beautiful death’ a hero gains a categorical confirmation of his aret, which, along 
with his everlasting youth, is reflected in the beauty of his corpse (e.g. 22.71-3, 369-
71).73 Attic painters sometimes represent this aret of the Athenian hoplite killed in 
action by painting in a lion, which is one of the animals that Homer uses as a symbol 
 
66 Van Wees 2008, 20. While we lack any reliable figures for calculating the relative size of 
the elite in this period, upper-class Athenians clearly numbered close to, but less than, 5 percent of 
the citizen-body in the later fifth and early fourth centuries (Hansen 1991, 90-4, 109-15; Pritchard 
1999a, 56-8; 2004, 212, 212-3 n.23; Taylor 2007, 89). 
67 Singor 2000, 107. 
68 This was most probably the case for the classical period (see Pritchard 1999b; Vickers 
2002). For this approach to images as evidence of mentality (called iconology), see Lissarrague 
1990, 1-12; Sabetai 1997, 330-1; Sparkes 1996, 135-9.  
69 Lissarrague 1990; Pritchard 1999a, 126-31.  
70 See especially Lissarrague 1990, 233-40; cf. Balot 2004a, 411.   
71 Bassi 2003, 38-8; Lissarrague 1990, 71-96. These scenes date approximately from 570 to 
480 (Lissarrague 1990, 71-2, 233).  
72 Vernant 1991, 50-74.   
73 Vernant 1991, 62-4.  
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of a hero’s martial excellence (e.g. Homer Iliad 5.782; Odyssey 18.161, 11.611).74 
Additionally they evoke his attainment of the ‘beautiful death’ of the heroes by 
giving him alone of the painted figures long hair and – along with his bearer – a so-
called Boeotian shield. Homer repeatedly draws attention to the long hair of his 
warrior heroes (e.g. Homer Iliad 3.43; 2.443, 472; 18.359), with the Boeotian shield 
consistently given to a named hero in Attic imagery.75 An elite citizen of sixth-
century Athens was also styled as an epic hero by his grave, whether he had died on 
or off the battlefield: its high mound, walled enclosure and funerary sculpture 
depicting him as a hoplite, athlete or in some other normative role of the elite was 
modeled on the standard monumental tomb of epic poetry, which helped guarantee 
the eternal renown and memory of the hero (e.g. Iliad 7.86-91; 23.245-8; Odyssey 
4.584-5; 11.75-6).76 Similarly the epigrams of elite Athenian tombs – like those of the 
fallen soldiers, Croisos, Tettichos and Xenocles – drew heavily on the vocabulary, 
imagery and concepts of epic poetry.77 
2. The Transformation of War in Fifth-Century Athens 
 
The small-scale and unexceptional warfare of the Athenians was transformed in 
the first instance by the reforms which Cleisthenes developed and introduced 
immediately after 508/7 (Ath. Pol. 20-1; Herodotus 5.66-73).78 These reforms 
effectively integrated Athens and its countryside for the first time.79 Each free male of 
Attica was now registered as a citizen of Athens in his local deme and groups of these 
villages and suburbs from across Athenian territory were linked together in ten tribes, 
which served as the subdivisions of the new popular council and a publicly controlled 
army of hoplites. The new registers of citizens in the demes were used to conscript 
hoplites for each tribal corps.80 This was the city’s first-ever mechanism for mass 
 
74 Lissarrague 1990, 75-6; Vernant 1991, 50. For an example of such an image, see 
Lissarrague 1990, 82-5, no. 79 (National Archaeological Museum [Athens], inv. no. 433). 
75 For the long hair of heroes, see Lissarrague 1990, 75; Vernant 1991, 65-7. For this 
signification of the Boeotian shield in Attic imagery, see Lissarrague 1990, 76; Vos 1963, 33, 36.  
76 For gravestones stones with hoplites, see, for example, Richter 1961, nos. 27, 45, 46, 65-7; 
cf. Richter 1944. For athletes, see, for example, Measham, Spathari and Donnelly 2000, cat. nos. 
24, 30, 43; Richter 1961, nos. 26, 28. For the elite burials of sixth-century Athens in general, see 
Kurtz and Boardman 1977, 68-90. For the appropriation of epic in the funeral ceremony and tomb, 
see Balot 2001, 76-7; Houby-Nielsen 1995; Humphreys 1980, 103-5. 
77 For the epigram of Croisos and its epic appropriations, Friedländer 1948, no. 82; Anderson 
2003, 27-9. For Tettichos, Friedländer 1948, no. 135; Anderson 2003, 153. For Xenocles, 
Friedländer 1948, no. 87; Robertson 2003; cf. 1997.  
78 For these reforms, see Meier 1990, 53-81; Ostwald 1986, 15-28.  
79 Anderson 2003, 13-42; Pritchard 2005a, 137-40.  
80 E.g. Aristophanes Peace 1173, 1179-86; IG I3 138.1-2, 5-6; cf. [Demosthenes] 50.6-7, 16. 
Christ 2001, 398-403; Hansen 1986, 65-9.  
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mobilisation and the standard way for raising hoplites until the second quarter of the 
fourth century.81 As Athens and its surrounding territory were around twenty times 
larger and more populous than the average-sized polis, this mechanism gave the 
Athenians an enormous military advantage.82 Demography would be one of the three 
major causes of the military revolution of fifth-century Athens.83 
Again for the first time Cleisthenes formally integrated the Athenian dmos into 
politics by making laws and public actions dependent on the approval of the assembly 
and the new popular Council of Five Hundred.84 Within several years the people were 
making the final decisions about activities which were once pursued privately by elite 
Athenians, such as foreign affairs (e.g. Herodotos 5.66, 96-7). Certainly it took 
several more decades for the institutions of democracy and its core concepts to be 
fully elaborated.85 However, as the reforms of Cleisthenes made the Athenian dmos 
the final arbiters of public policy and framed the future development of their 
constitution, Josiah Ober is surely right to view them as the true beginning of 
dmokratia at Athens.86 To lead the new publicly controlled army effectively the 
Athenians created, in 501/0, a board of ten generals, who were drawn (like other 
newly created magistrates) one from each Cleisthenic tribe.87 Certainly these reforms 
massively increased the military capacity of the Athenians and their readiness to 
initiate campaigns: in 506 their army defeated those of Chalcis and Boeotia in back-
to-back battles (Herodotus 5.74-7), in 498 they sent 20 ships to help the Ionian 
Greeks revolt from the Persian Empire (5.97) and, in 490, at the battle of Marathon 
they deployed 9000 heavily armed soldiers, which was a hoplite army far larger than 
any other Greek polis at the time.88 
Interrelated events of the late 480s and early 470s set in train a second phase of 
Athenian military innovations. To help win an ongoing war against Aegina and ready 
for the likely return of the Persians the Athenian people decided, in 483/2, to direct a 
windfall of locally mined silver towards the massive expansion of their new publicly 
controlled navy (Ath. Pol. 22.7; Herodotus 6.87-93; 7.144.1-2; Thucydides 1.14.1-
 
81 Christ 2001, 412-6; 2006, 49 n.15, 52. Contra van Wees 2001, 46, 59-61; 2006, 371-6.  
82 For these measurements, see Hansen 2006a, 77-84; Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 70-3; Ober 
2008b, 84-6.  
83 Brock and Hodkinson 2000, 9; Ober 2008b, 60; Pritchard 2005b, 18.  
84 Anderson 2003, 43-84.  
85 Ober 1998b, 70-4.  
86 For third-party support of Ober on balance in his ongoing debate with Raaflaub about 
whether the reforms of Cleisthenes or Ephialtes marked the true beginning of Athenian democracy, 
see, for example, Cartledge 2007, 164-5; 2009, 57-62; Farrar 2007, 171-5; Pritchard 2005a, 142-5 
with bibliography.  
87 Fornara 1971; Hansen 1991, 34-5.  
88 Herodotus 5.74-7, 97-103 ; cf. 7.158; Nepos Miltiades 5.
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2).89 The 200 triremes which they possessed at the end of this shipbuilding 
represented ‘the largest fleet of polis-owned warships yet seen’.90 Three years later 
the Great King launched his expedition to subjugate the Greeks of the mainland as 
the Persians had recently done to those of Ionia and the Hellespont. The final 
destruction of this huge Persian force, in 479, and the inability of the Spartans to 
effectively lead the liberation of the Ionians saw the Athenians invited to found the 
so-called Delian League, which initially was a voluntary alliance of city-states 
contributing ships and soldiers or annual tribute to Athenian-led expeditions (e.g. 
Thucydides 1.94-7).91 For its first few decades the league campaigned frequently to 
expel Persian forces from strong points and naval bases across the Aegean, destroy 
the Phoenician fleet and liberate Greek cities (e.g. 1.97-8).92 At the same time the 
Athenians began a long process of eroding the independence of their allies, who, by 
the early 440s, were obliged to pay annual tribute and subject to relevant laws of the 
Athenian dmos and had long been forcefully prevented from pulling out of the 
Athenian arkh or empire.93 This tribute and other imperial revenues allowed the 
Athenians to employ vast numbers of lower-class citizens as hoplites and sailors and 
to pioneer new forms of warfare.94 This unprecedented supply of money was clearly 
another major reason for the military innovations and success of fifth-century 
Athenians.   
 Most of the military innovations which the Athenians invented or perfected sat 
uneasily with their own prevailing definition of courage. Since the hoplite continued 
to be the norm for generalisations about military affairs in fifth-century Athens, this 
virtue was defined in terms of the tactical requirements of phalanx-based battle.95 
Therefore courage, which was usually called aret or andreia in popular literature, 
required a soldier to remain steadfast (e.g. Aristophanes Peace 1177-8; Euripides 
 
89 Gabrielsen 1994, 31-6. 
90 De Souza 1998, 286.  
91 Meiggs 1972, 42-9; Rhodes 2006, 15-19.  
92 Meiggs 1972, 68-83;  
93 Meiggs 1972, 152-74; Rhodes 2006, 20-1, 41-51. Contra Fornara and Samons 1991, 76-
113.   
94 The following discussion of Athenian military innovations draws on Hanson 2001, 7-17; 
Pritchard 2005b, 18-21; Raaflaub 1991; 1999, 141-4; 2007b. Payment for sailors began with the 
second Persian War (e.g. Ath Pol. 23.1; Plutarch Cimon 9.4; Themistocles 10.4), while hoplites 
possibly began to be paid at the same time, in the 450s, when pay was introduced for the city’s 
councillors and jurors (Ath. Pol. 27.3-4; Plato Gorgias 515e); see, for example, Gabrielsen 2007, 
257-8; Pritchett 1971-91, volume 1, 3-29; van Wees 2004, 237, 316 n.27.  
95 For the ideological centrality of the hoplite in classical Athens, see Pritchard 1998a, 33-53; 
1999a, 76-161; Roisman 2005, 106-9. For the character and tactical requirements of phalanx-based 
battle, see, for example, Cawkwell 1989; Goldsworthy 1997; Krentz 1985a; 1994; Pritchard 1999a, 
105-7; van Wees 2004, 184-91. Contra Luginbill 1994.  
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Electra 388-90).96 As a consequence a brave man ‘stands beside a shield’ (Euripides 
Phoenician Women 1003) and does not ‘flee from the spear’ (Aeschylus Persians 
1025; cf. Lysias 14.15-16). In doing so he was without fear (Lysias 14.15) and 
voluntarily accepted the possibility of ‘a sudden wound of the spear’ (Euripides 
Heracles 159-64) or death (e.g. Phoenician Women 999-1002; Lysias 2.14-15; 
Thucydides 2.42.4). For classical Athenians such possibilities had to be faced, as 
battle was full of kindunoi or dangers.97 Although this definition of aret primarily as 
steadfastness clashes with our own more active view of courage, it dovetails with 
what was required of every hoplite in battle.98 With hand-to-hand fighting confined to 
the first two ranks, the majority of heavy infantrymen played only a passive role. But 
their steadfastness was clearly a precondition of victory. The front ranks took solace 
from knowing that others could relieve them if they were injured or exhausted.99 No 
less importantly with a mass of hoplites behind them they could not easily take flight 
before they had defeated their opponents.100 
Despite this characterisation of courage as a passive behaviour, classical 
Athenians still recognised that victory also depended on ‘the bravery and aggression’ 
of the front ranks ‘to keep on attacking the enemy until he finally broke’.101 This is 
put beyond doubt by the aristeia or first prize for aret, which the Athenians awarded 
to the bravest fighter of individual battles throughout the classical period.102 This 
prize was so standard that Plato treated it as a regular part of military affairs (e.g. 
Republic 468b-c; Menexenus 240e-1a), while Sophocles anachronistically linked it 
with warriors of the heroic age (e.g. Antigone 194-7; Ajax 434-40, 443, 468, 1300; 
Philoctetes 1425-9). To determine the winner of this agn in bravery (cf. Sophocles 
Ajax 1239-40), generals consulted widely (Plato Symposium 220d; Laws 943c; 
Plutarch Alcibiades 7.3). According to our sources (Sophocles Ajax 434-40; 
Philoctetes 1425-9; Herodotus 8.11, 71), those judged first in aret stood out as a 
 
96 Aret is the favoured term for courage in the funerary epigrams of Athenian soldiers (e.g. 
IG I3 1179.3, 8-9; 1162.48) and the oration traditionally delivered at their public funeral (e.g. Lysias 
2.6, 12, 20, 40, 64-5, 69-70; Plato Menexenus 240d, 243c; Thucydides 2.36.1, 42.2), where it is also 
used occasionally to describe non-martial aspects of the normative behaviour of a citizen (e.g. 
Thucydides 2.40.4, 37.1-2, 42.2; cf. Demosthenes 60.3; Hyperides Funeral Oration 19). Comedy, 
tragedy and oratory prefer andreia and other synonyms for courage. See Balot 2004a, 407-8; 
Pritchard 1999a, 86-7. 
97 E.g. Aeschines 2.169; Euripides Suppliant Women 572; Lysias 2.3, 47, 77, 61, 78; 14.7; 
16.12-13, 17, Thucydides 2.39.1, 43.4, 62.1.  
98 Lendon 2005, 51-5; Pritchard 1999a, 96-9.  
99 Cawkwell 1989, 388-9; Krentz 1985a, 59.  
100 Goldsworthy 1997, 24.  
101 Goldsworthy 1997, 24.  
102 E.g. Aeschines 2.169; Herodotus 8.17, 93; 9.74, 104; Isocrates 16.29-31; Plato Symposium 
220d; Plutarch Alcibiades 7.2-3. Christ 2006, 110-11; Hamel 1998b, 64-70. 
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result, not of their steadfastness, but of their ‘great deeds’. Thus the first prize for 
bravery suggests that megala erga constituted a secondary requirement of courage for 
the classical Athenians.  
 Imperial income enabled the Athenian dmos not only to launch large fleets but 
also to train their sailors regularly for weeks or months before any engagement.103 So 
trained each crew could manoeuvre their ship autonomously or as part of a formation 
in order to break through or outflank the lines of an enemy’s fleet.104 As the 
Athenians quickly acquired more tekhn or skill as sailors than any other Greeks (e.g. 
Thucydides 2.85.2-3), they pioneered a highly mobile form of combat in which they 
attempted to win by ramming and hence disabling as many enemy ships as possible 
(e.g. Aeschylus Persians 408-20). This represented a decisive change from traditional 
sea warfare where the agn or battle had long been decided by the hand-to-hand 
struggles of hoplites and lightly armed troops on the decks (e.g. Thucydides 1.49.1-4; 
7.62.3-4).105 In this ‘Athenian way of fighting at sea’ sailors clearly could not meet 
two of the prevailing criteria for courage.106 As they worked together to turn their 
ship’s ram into their offensive weapon (e.g. Xenophon Estate-Management 8.8), they 
did not have the opportunity to display ‘great deeds’ individually. More significantly 
they employed flight as a tactic. Athenian triremes quickly backed away from the 
ships which they had rammed to prevent the enemy’s hoplites from boarding. If they 
were overwhelmed by the size of the opposing fleet, they normally attempted to flee 
to friendly shores or to outrun their pursuers (e.g. Thucydides 2.84.4, 90.5-6, 91.1), 
only returning to battle if they could counterattack effectively (e.g. 2.91.1-92.2). The 
revenues of their empire also allowed the Athenians to develop specialised corps of 
cavalry and archers. Thus in the later 440s or early 430s they trebled the number of 
their horsemen to create Greece’s largest cavalry-corps outside of Thessaly 
(Aeschines 2.172-4; Andocides 3.5, 7), while they had expanded their archery corps 
to 1600 members by 431 (Ath. Pol. 24.3; Thucydides 2.13.7-8).107 As other cities 
usually hired mercenaries from peoples who had strong traditions of fighting as a 
horsemen and archers whenever they wanted to employ such combatants, the early-
fifth-century decisions of the Athenian dmos to establish these two corps in the first 
 
103 For this training, see, for example, Plutarch Cimon 11.2-3; Pseudo-Xenophon 1.19-20; 
Thucydides 1.80, 142.6-7; 2.84-86, 89; Xenophon Memorabilia 3.5.18.
104 Morrison 1974; Morrison and Coates 1986, 25-45.  
105 Strauss 2007, 229-36. For the use of agn to describe a sea battle, see, for example, 
Aeschylus Persians 405; Thucydides 2.89.8, 10. 
106 Pritchard 1999a, 115-17. Quotation from Strauss 2007, 231. 
107 For approximate dates for the establishment and subsequent expansion of each corps, see 
Spence 1993, 9-17 and Plassart 1913, 195-7 respectively.  
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place represented a clear military innovation.108 However, Athenian cavalrymen and 
archers clearly also fell short of the popular standard of courage; for they faced lower 
personal risks than hoplites or sailors, as they launched their javelins or arrows at the 
greatest possible distance from their enemies, took to flight if they were pursued and 
only turned back to the offensive when their pursuers had given up.109 
Before Philip the Second of Macedon siege warfare was rudimentary in the 
eastern Mediterranean: besiegers tried to starve a city into capitulation by blockading 
its harbour and using counter walls to cut access to its khra or rural hinterland.110 
Since this could take more than a year to be effective, the Athenians of the early fifth-
century were forced to abandon sieges for want of sufficient resources (e.g. 
Herodotus 6.135; 9.75). But imperial income allowed them to conduct sieges 
successfully, from which they gained a reputation for exceptional expertise in this 
form of warfare (e.g. Thucydides 1.102.2). The Athenians treated the inhabitants of a 
besieged city which surrendered differently to hoplites whom they had captured on 
the battlefield: they typically executed the men and sold the women and children into 
slavery, probably leaving the elderly and babies to die of starvation, exposure or 
attack by wolves and dogs (e.g. Xenophon Agesilaos 1.21-2).111 In doing so they 
were no more or less brutal than others dealing with captured cities and were acting 
according to a nomos or custom which had been long recognised even if it had not 
been regularly practiced.112 
The Athenians also set themselves apart by building fortifications which were 
unprecedented in their scale and for linking an astu (‘urban centre’) to a relatively 
distant port.113 Immediately after the Persian Wars the entire population of Athens 
mobilised to quickly build the walls of the city and the Piraeus (Thucydides 1.89.3-
103.8). In 458/7 the Athenian dmos resolved to build two walls from the city, one to 
the northern edge of the port and the other to the eastern end of the Bay of Phalerum, 
probably completing these six kilometres of new walls in just one year (1.107.1, 
 
108 Hunt 2007, 110, 136.  
109 For the horsemen’s mode of combat, see, for example, Diodorus 15.85.2-8; Lysias 16.13; 
Plato Symposium 221a; Thucydides 2.79; 5.10.9-10; Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.20; Pritchard 1999a, 
112-3; Spence 1993, 34-163. For the archers’ combat, see, for example, Euripides Heracles 195-
203; Thucydides 2.79.9; 3.97.1; 4.32.4, 43.1-2; 6.69.2; 8.71.2; Pritchard 1999a, 108-9.  
110 Hanson 2001, 11-12; Strauss 2007, 237-9; van Wees 2000, 94, 101-4. 
111 E.g. Diodorus 12.73.3, 76.3-4; Thucydides 5.3.4, 11.3, 32.1.  
112 E.g. Homer Iliad 2.691; 9.665-8; 11.623-5; Odyssey 9.39-61; Xenophon Hellenica 1.6.14; 
Memorabilia 4.2.15. Connor 1988, 15 n.59; de Sainte Croix 1954, 14-16; Krentz 2002, 31-2 pace 
Ober 1996, 62. 
113 Hanson 2001, 10-1; Raaflaub 1999, 142; Rhodes 2006, 41-2; Strauss 2007, 239-40. 
Thucydides implies that the Athenians pioneered the building of ‘long walls’ between Megara and 
its port of Nisaea before doing the same in Attica a few years later (1.103.4, 107.1).  
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108.3-4; Diodorus 11.81.1-83.3).114 Finally, in 446/5, they started to build another 
wall between city and port, parallel to the existing one to the north (Aeschines 2.174; 
Andocides 3.7). ‘The construction of such an elaborate system of fortifications in 
such a brief period is a staggering achievement, especially when it is remembered 
that the Athenians were at war for most of the period and consequently capable of 
diverting manpower into constructive work only during the brief periods afforded by 
peace.’115 Such fortifications enabled the Athenians to respond to any invasion of 
their khra in a novel way: instead of sending out their hoplites for a clash of 
phalanxes they could withdraw their rural population and moveable property within 
the fortified Athens–Piraeus complex, transport livestock to islands which they 
controlled and rely on the imported grain and tribute guaranteed by their control of 
the sea (Pseudo-Xenophon 2.16). This new option was first pursued at the beginning 
of the Peloponnesian War as part of the so-called island strategy which the city’s 
preeminent politician Pericles championed (Thucydides 1.143.4-5).116 Thus, in 431, 
when the combined army of the Peloponnesian League ravaged Attica, Pericles 
overcame spirited opposition and convinced his fellow citizens to remain within the 
walls. Such opposition is easy to understand: the Athenians felt org or great anger at 
the sight of Attica being laid waste and many of them wanted to march out to stop it 
(2.11.6-7, 20.2-3, 21.2-22.1), while some of Pericles’ political rivals probably 
construed this policy as cowardice (e.g. Plutarch Pericles 33.6).117 
The general intensification and expansion of war-making by fifth-century 
Athens depended on the unprecedented service of non-elite citizens as hoplites and 
sailors and their unflagging willingness to fight and risk their lives for the city.118 
Soldiering under the democracy was no longer a predominantly elite pastime but was 
opened up – like politics – to every stratum of the citizen-body. The most reliable 
estimate of the massively expanded number of hoplites derives from what Pericles 
says of the city’s manpower, in 431, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War (2.13.6-7; 
cf. Diodorus 12.40.4). He assured his nervous countrymen that they had 13,000 
hoplites and another 16,000 guarding the forts and the city’s walls that were drawn 
‘from the oldest and the youngest and all of the metics who were hoplites (apo te tn
presbutatn kai tn netotn kai metoikn hosoi hoplitai san – Thucydides 2.13.7)’. 
The last figure has always been perceived as disproportionate to the number of 
 
114 Garland 1987, 22-6.  
115 Garland 1987, 25-6.  
116 For this grand strategy, see Krentz 1997; Ober 1996, 72-85; and the chapter by Spence in 
this volume. Archaic Miletus provides a precedent for some elements of this strategy (Herodotus 
1.17).  
117 For the refusal to take the field as evidence of cowardice, see part 4 below.  
118 Ober 1998b, 78.  
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active-service hoplites and accounting for this reserve force has been the subject of 
indeterminable debate.119 Every attempt to breakdown the 16,000 into its constituent 
groups or reconcile the two figures has shortcomings and no scholarly consensus has 
ever emerged.120 As a result the calculation of total hoplite numbers can only be 
based on the 13,000 active-service infantrymen, which is a figure that finds some 
corroboration in what Thucydides reports about the first military ventures of the war 
(2.31.1-2; cf. 1.61.4). 
 A good way to estimate what percentage of Athenians were hoplites is to 
combine this 13,000 with the population figure which Mogens Herman Hansen has 
estimated for 431 and his choice of the most appropriate Coale–Demeny life table for 
approximating ancient Greek conditions.121 As Mark Golden and others have shown, 
Hansen’s population figures and choice of life table remain valid and effectively 
unchallenged.122 For the number of citizens living in Attica at the outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian War Hansen does not rely on the military figures of Pericles but works 
backwards from the better documented situation for the fourth century. A variety of 
administrative and military figures point to a population of approximately 30,000 
adult citizens living in Attica during the second half of the fourth century.123 From 
this total Hansen deducts the likely population growth for its first fifty years and 
hence arrives at a figure of around 25,000 adult Athenians at the close of the fifth 
century.124 Finally he estimates how many citizens there needed to be in 431 to order 
to end up at this figure for 400, while at the same time absorbing the huge losses of 
population which Thucydides and Xenophon report for the period of the 
Peloponnesian War. The result is approximately 60,000 adult male citizens living in 
Attica at the outbreak of hostilities.125 What percentage of the population our 13,000 
hoplites represent depends obviously on the number of Athenians available for 
military expeditions. Notwithstanding a recent argument to the contrary, the so-called 
youngest and the oldest, who were not liable for active military service, were most 
probably citizens of 18 to 19 and 50 to 59 years of age respectively.126 The netatoi 
are clearly the precursors of the ephboi or the eighteen- and nineteen-year-old cadets 
 
119 E.g. Gomme 1956, volume 2, 33-9; Hansen 1981, 19-20; A.H.M. Jones 1956, 161-6.  
120 E.g. van Wees 2004, 241-3.  
121 Hansen 1981; 1986; 1988; 2006b, 19-60. Hansen (1986, 11-12) argues for the life table at 
Coale and Demeny 1966, 128, which has an annual growth of population of 0.5 percent.  
122 Golden 2000; Osborne 1987; van Wees 2001, 52.  
123 Hansen 1986; 1991, 90-4.  
124 Hansen 1988, 26-8.  
125 Hansen 1991, 55. His figure finds some corroboration in the independent population-
estimate of Rhodes 1988, 271-7.  
126 Christ 2001, 404; Hansen 1988, 23. Following A.H.M. Jones (1957, 164), van Wees 
suggests that the ‘the oldest’ extended down to forty years of age (2004, 242). 
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of the next century.127 We know too that men in their fifties were not required to fight 
at the battle of Chaeronea, in 338, despite the gravity of the military crisis (Lycurgus 
1.39-40), while Aristophanes writes of grey-haired members of the phalanx and cases 
of famous Athenians serving in their forties are well documented.128 Those available 
for active service then appear to have been 20 to 49 years of age. As they constitute 
72.7 percent of all males aged between 18 and 80+ years on the relevant life table, the 
estimate of their number is 43,620.129 Therefore the 13,000 hoplites of 431 probably 
represented 29.8 percent of militarily active citizens.  
 Traditionally scholars have argued that the type of military service an Athenian 
performed depended on the Solonian telos or income class to which he belonged.130 
As a consequence service as a hoplite has been interpreted as compulsory for every 
citizen whose plots of land produced at least two-hundred measures of produce 
annually, which qualified him for membership of the zeugitai (‘yoke-men’) or third 
lowest of Solon’s income classes (Ath. Pol. 7.3-4). Likewise the top two classes are 
supposed to have provided the city’s trierarchs and cavalrymen and the thtes or 
lowest class its sailors and lightly armed troops. This argument goes back to the 
German-language scholarship of the nineteenth century.131 However, as a result of 
two scholarly developments of recent years this association of Solonian classes and 
forms of military service needs now to be abandoned entirely. The first of these 
developments is the culmination of the comparative study of ancient Greek 
agriculture, which suggests that an Athenian would have needed much more than a 
subsistence-level farm to qualify as a zeugits.132 Hans van Wees has undertaken by 
far the most thorough and careful estimate of the minimum area required, which is 
some 8.7 hectares.133 As the most generous assessment of the amount of arable land 
in Attica is only 96,000 hectares, there was not even enough land for the 13,000 
active-service hoplites of 431 to qualify for this income class. Moreover, when we 
estimate how much agricultural land the members of the other three classes probably 
owned, what emerges is that the top three Solonian tel would have furnished less 
 
127 See Winkler 1990, 29 with primary sources.  
128 E.g. Aristophanes Lysistrata 595. Demosthenes was 46 years-old when he fought as a 
hoplite at Chaeronea (Aeschines 3.253; Plutarch Demosthenes 20.2), while Socrates fought at least 
twice as a hoplite in his mid-40s (Plato Apology 28c; Symposium 220b-1c; Plutarch Alcibiades 7.4).   
129 Hansen 1986, 9-13; 1988, 21 n.9.  
130 E.g. Hansen 1991, 45-6; Garlan 1995, 65; A.H.M. Jones 1957, 161, 180; Murray 1993, 
194-5; Ober 1996, 58; Okál 1960, 101; Spence 1993, 180-2. De Sainte Croix 2004, 8, 20; 
Gabrielsen 2002a, 214; Vartsos 1978, 232-3.  
131 Rosivach 2002a, 33-9; cf. Rosivach 2002b; 2005.  
132 Foxhall 1997, 130-1. The first to realise how this finding called into the question the 
association of zeugitai and hoplites was Raaflaub (1999, 138, 150-1 n.49).  
133 Van Wees 2001, 47-54; cf. van Wees 2002, 65-70; 2004, 55-7.  
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than one half of the hoplites Athens had ready for action at the outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian War.134 
The second development undermining any military function for the Solonian 
classes is philological. Several scholars have pointed out that the common 
interpretation of zeugits as a synonym for a hoplite rests solely on a Roman-period 
source (Plutarch Pelopidas 23.2), which describes a unique feature of the Spartan 
army (cf. Thucydides 5.58.2-3; Xenophon Lac. Pol. 11.5-10).135 In addition Vincent 
Rosivach has argued that the two Athenian sources which purportedly show that 
members of the lowest Solonian telos were never regular hoplites are essentially 
ambiguous (Antiphon fragment 61 Thalheim; Thucydides 6.43.1); for both, he 
suggests, may be using ‘thtes’ to denote either members of the so-named telos or 
hired labourers, which is the term’s other contemporary and common meaning (e.g. 
Plato Politicus 290a; Aristotle Politics 1278a12-13).136 While the first of these 
passages is clearly ambiguous, as its single line provides no context for clarifying 
how the word is being used, there has long been agreement among scholars that 
thtes in the second passage refers to members of the lowest census class who had 
been equipped as hoplites at public expense.137 In spite of this consensus Rosivach’s 
suggestion does have some merit: on closer inspection the historian could indeed be 
using thtes in the alternate sense. At 6.43.1 Thucydides catalogues how the hoplites 
whom Athens sent on the expedition of 416/5 to Sicily included 1500 Athenians who 
had been conscripted (ek katalogou) and another 700 thtes epibatai tn nen or 
thtes serving as marines on the ships. We know that classical Athenians regularly 
made a distinction between those who undertook military services because they had 
been conscripted (ek katalogou) and others who did so without compulsion (e.g. 
Diodorus 11.84.4; [Demosthenes] 50.6-7, 35; Lysias 16.13-14), whom they called hoi 
ethelontes or volunteers (e.g. Plato Menexenus 245a; Thucydides 1.60; 2.96.2-3).138 
Moreover, at the time of the so-called Sicilian Expedition Athenian hoplites may 
have normally volunteered for service as marines, as a fragmentary inscription of 
around 430 refers to a recruitment of ethelontes epibatas or volunteer marines in 
 
134 Van Wees 2001, 51-5.  
135 Gabrielsen 2002b, 88; Rosivach 2002a, 34-9; van Wees 2006, 352-60. This interpretation 
of zeugits goes back to Conrad Cichorius (1894) and has been defended by Whitehead (1981).  
136 Rosivach 2002a, 34. See also Aristotle Politics 1317a25-6; 1319a28; 1329a36; 1321a5-8; 
Euripides Cyclops 76-81; Electra 205; Isocrates 11.38; 14.48; Plato Euthyphro 4c; Republic 359d; 
Gabrielsen 2002a, 212-14 with primary sources.  
137 E.g. de Sainte Croix 2004, 21; Gomme 1956, volume 2, 42, 80, 271; Hansen 1991, 45-6; 
Jordan 1975, 195-200; cf. Gabrielsen 2002a, 204; 2002b, 92; van Wees 2001, 46; 2006, 371.  
138 Christ 2001, 399; 2006, 49; Gabrielsen 2002a, 204; 2002b, 92.   
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accordance with a pre-existing law (IG I3 60.9-16).139 Since Athenian military 
volunteers received a daily misthos and a ths or hired labourer worked voluntarily 
for pay, thtes as a term could conceivably have been used as a very loose synonym 
for hoi ethelontes. All of this makes it possible that Thucydides may have been 
drawing a distinction between different modes of recruitment rather than Solonian 
tel at 6.43.1. If this was the case, however, one wonders why he ignored the normal 
term for volunteers for one with very different connotations. A likely explanation lies 
in the role which the Sicilian Expedition’s departure played in his oeuvre (6.30-32.2, 
43-44.1).140 In this unusually long description of a naval force’s embarkation and 
composition Thucydides used selection of ‘details and foci, significant silences, and 
the careful choice of terms’ to substantiate the judgement, which he had expressed 
earlier (6.24.3-4), that lower-class Athenians voted for this risky expedition because 
they believed it would secure misthos for themselves for the foreseeable future.141 
The passing over of ethelontes for thtes clearly helped reinforce this negative view: 
the first term suppresses the fact that volunteers received a misthos, making it 
possible to construe their service as a commendable act of patriotism, whereas the 
second term strongly implies that voluntary combatants served primarily for pay.  
 Finally we have the clear counter example of the city’s cavalry corps, which was 
formed in the second quarter of the fifth century and expanded from 300 to 1000 
upper-class members sometime in the later 440s or early 430s (see above). Although 
the classical Athenians used ‘hippeis’ interchangeably to describe either members of 
the second highest telos (e.g. Ath. Pol. 7.4; Thucydides 3.16.1) or cavalrymen (e.g. 
Aristophanes Knights 225, 550; Xenophon Cavalry-Commander 1.2, 3), this income 
class manifestly played no part in the recruitment of horsemen.142 By law they had to 
be drawn from ‘the most able in wealth and physical capacity’ (Xenophon Cavalry-
Commander 1.9-10) and sanctions were available to compel those unwilling to serve, 
despite their meeting of these criteria (10-11). Like chorus-masters (e.g. Antiphon 
6.11), however, cavalry-commanders seem to have attracted sufficient volunteers by 
pointing out to potential recruits the adventure and advantages of service and to their 
fathers how joining the corps would actually cut down the amount of money which 
 
139 Citizens serving as epibatai had a relatively high social status and were drawn from among 
those who normally served as hoplites; see, for example, Aristotle Politics 1327b9-11; Lysias 6.46; 
Plato Laches 183c-4b; Laws 706b-c; Thucydides 3.98.4, 95.2; IG I3 1032; Gabrielsen 2002a, 211; 
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was forced to conscript regular hoplites for service as marines (Thucydides 8.24.2).  
140 Steiner 2005.  
141 Quotation from Steiner 2005, 411. 
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their sons were already spending on horsy pursuits, leaving legal sanctions as a last 
resort (9-12; cf. Ath. Pol. 49.1-2; Aristophanes Clouds 14-16, 119-20).143 
If service as a hoplite was not a compulsory requirement of those who belonged 
to the zeugitai-class, some have suggested that it was no less voluntary than 
membership of the cavalry corps.144 What limited evidence we have lends this 
support: a hoplite may have been conscripted for individual campaigns, but he 
probably volunteered to be registered in his lxiarkhikon grammateion or deme-
register as a hoplite in the first place if he had the desire and the personal resources to 
be part of the city’s phalanx (e.g. Lysias 16.14). Admittedly a young man whose 
father was or had been a hoplite or who came from a prosperous family would have 
encountered social pressure within his village to be a hoplite himself.145 However, as 
only 5 percent or so of sixth-century Athenians had been militarily active (see part 1 
above), the thousands of lower-class citizens who flocked to the city’s phalanx after 
508/7 did so in spite of having no family history of fighting for the city. Fighting in 
the phalanx entailed serious personal risks and was clearly much more dangerous 
than service as a cavalryman or lightly armed soldier.146 It also required a citizen to 
have some travel money to supplement his military pay and to purchase his own 
armour and weapons, which could cost months of wages.147 In these circumstances 
the growth of hoplite-numbers to 30 percent of the citizen-body by 431 at the latest is 
truly remarkable and not easily accounted for. The Athenian commitment to building 
and maintaining a massive war fleet made soldiering possible for the majority of 
citizens who were too poor to be hoplites.148 Typically rowers were not conscripted 
for each expedition but volunteered their services to the upper-class commanders of 
individual triremes.149 Naval service was demanding and could also be very 
dangerous.150 Throughout the century a changing proportion of sailors in the fleet 
were resident aliens (e.g. Thucydides 1.143.1; 7.63.3-4), allies (e.g. 1.121.3; 7.13.2) 
 
143 Spence 1993, 181-2.  
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and slaves (e.g. 7.13.2).151 But the largest portion, numbering thousands per 
expedition, appear to have been Athenian (e.g. Pseudo-Xenophon 1.2; Thucydides 
1.142.6; 8.74-7).  
3. The Important Problem: The Apparent Impact of Democracy on 
Athenian War-Making  
 
A striking feature of the history of fifth-century Athens is the timing of this 
military revolution: the intensification and transformation of war by the Athenians 
directly follow the popular uprising of 508/7 and coincide with the flowering of 
Athenian culture, which was clearly brought about in large part by democracy. The 
near contemporaneity of these developments opens up some challenging possibilities. 
The military hyperactivity of fifth-century Athens may be another product of popular 
government and hence the dark side of its cultural revolution. Indeed this shaping of 
military affairs by civilian life may have been profound in classical Athens where the 
army literally was the democracy under arms; for those who participated so actively 
in its politics and determined its military policies also served as its generals, hoplites 
and sailors. On the other hand, as the public activity which dominated the lives and 
politics of classical Athenians, war could have impacted significantly on the 
consolidation of their democracy. In other words there possibly was a causal 
symbiosis between democracy and war in ancient Athens. 
 Among contemporary witnesses of Athenian war-making perceptions of the 
positive impact of democracy on military performance were more widespread than is 
usually assumed. Herodotus put down the unexpected Athenian victories of 506 over 
Boeotia and Chalcis to the new democracy. The personal liberty and isgoria (‘equal 
right of speech’) which were consolidated by the reforms of Cleisthenes turned the 
Athenians into the world’s best soldiers (Herodotus 5.78-9; cf. Isocrates 16.27). In his 
funeral speech of 338/7 Demosthenes similarly argued that the parrhsia (‘freedom 
of speech’) of the Athenians guaranteed their strong feeling of shame about cowardly 
behaviour and hence undergirded their unsurpassed resolve on the battlefield (60.25-
6). Thucydides subjected Athenian military performance to much closer analysis. In a 
frequently cited passage of his History ambassadors from Corinth sketched out the 
general characteristics of the Athenians as soldiers as part of their efforts to convince 
the Spartans to strike against Athens before it was too late. For the Corinthians 
Athens had won so much and was such a menace to Sparta and its allies because of 
the flexibility and innovations of its citizens, their ambition for greater power, and 
their subordinating of private interests to the long-term good of the city (Thucydides 
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1.70-1). Thucydides is normally assumed to have viewed these as innate ‘national’ 
characteristics of the Athenians.152 But Josiah Ober (chapter 2) demonstrates that 
Thucydides, in fact, used the famous funeral speech of Pericles to canvass practices 
of the democracy which supported more or less directly the agility, ambition and 
common-good seeking which the Corinthians attributed to their enemies (e.g. 2.37.2, 
39.1, 40.2-3). Ober also shows how Thucydides’ accounts of Athenian campaigns 
during the Archidamian War illustrate the ways in which these politically produced 
dispositions affected the foreign-policy deliberations of the dmos and the battlefield 
performance of their generals, sailors and soldiers (e.g. 3.1-50, 4.1-41). 
 That democracy itself may be the third major cause of the Athenian revolution 
in military affairs finds support in a number of groundbreaking political-science 
studies to have appeared in the last several years. In particular Dan Reiter and Allan 
Stam put beyond doubt the general superiority of democracy in waging war. Drawing 
on the database of all modern wars compiled by the US Army, they demonstrate 
statistically that modern democracies have enjoyed far greater military success than 
other types of regime, winning over 90 percent of the wars which they have initiated 
and around 80 percent of all wars which they have fought.153 The main reason which 
Reiter and Stam propose for this military success is institutional: since citizens of a 
democracy are able to vote leaders out of office and usually do so if a war is lost or 
too many of their loved ones are killed in action, governments select wars which 
seem easily winnable and only initiate them if there is broad public support.154 This 
selection is supported by rigorous public debates among politicians and in civil 
society, which bring to the fore relevant information for decision-making and 
arguments for and against alternate options for foreign policy.155 Another reason 
which Reiter and Stam suggest is that the individual endeavour and meritocracy 
which democracies foster produce soldiers with greater initiative and leadership-skills 
than those of other regime-types.156 Independent studies, on balance, corroborate their 
finding of a democratic advantage in modern war-making.157 In addition other 
political scientists have recently shown how show that while modern democracies 
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may rarely fight each other, they have frequently fought colonial wars or attacked 
weak non-democratic neighbours.158 Finally Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder 
prove statistically and via case studies that modern states undergoing a democratic 
transition start wars much more frequently than either consolidated democracies or 
authoritarian governments.159 
This research directly challenges the so-called Realist School which has 
dominated the theory of international relations since the Second World War and 
whose antecedents can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes’ interpretation of 
Thucydides.160 Proponents of this school assume that every state rationally calculates 
its foreign policy on the basis of what will maximise its security, power and 
economic wellbeing, regardless of the type of political regime it may have. In 
addition these recent studies confound two pieces of popular wisdom about 
democracy. The first of these popular views is that democracies are particularly bad 
at prosecuting wars.161 Expressed most famously by Alexis de Tocqueville, the 
nineteenth-century commentator on American democracy, this assumes that the 
liberty of a democracy undercuts military discipline, while the fear its leaders have of 
the voters and the complexity of its decision-making mean the tough policies 
necessary for security are not always introduced quickly enough or at all. Secondly, 
this evidence of democratic bellicosity contradicts a cherished view of our post-war 
era that democracies are intrinsically peace-seeking: they abhor violence in 
international relations, prefer non-violent forms of conflict resolution and fight wars 
reluctantly, doing so only in self-defence.162 In recent decades political scientists have 
developed this second popular belief into a general theory, which postulates that 
democracies rarely fight each other and hence should be promoted on a regional basis 
for the sake of peace and security.163 This theory has had an enduring influence on 
foreign policy in the United States, since the early 1990s, and was used by President 
George W. Bush to justify retrospectively his 2003 invasion of Iraq.164 
These widely held beliefs go a long way to explain why the relationship of 
democracy and war in any period of world history has attracted relatively little 
scholarly attention.165 In this regard historians of ancient Greece have not been an 
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161 Merom 2003, 244; Reiter and Stam 2002, 2-3, 146-7.  
162 Keane 2004, 17-20; Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 1-2, 23-4; Merom 2003, 244-5; Reiter 
and Stam 2002, 2-3, 146-7, 150. 
163 E.g. Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001.  
164 Carothers 2006, 64; Russett 2005, 395-8; Russett and Antholis 1992, 415.  
165 For this lack of attention, see Merom 2003, 3-18, 250; Reiter and Stam 2002, 2. 
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exception: they have assumed warfare to be a coherent subject of study in its own 
right and hence explicable without reference to political and social factors.166 As a 
consequence most of our military studies have focussed on the organisation and 
battlefield record of a particular wing of the Athenian military or the general 
contribution of a class of soldier to Greek warfare.167 Others have studied the battles 
and strategies of particular wars or the general evolution of military practices in the 
Greek or Graeco-Roman world.168 Nonetheless some examples of a broader approach 
have appeared: good work has been done on the social background of Athenian 
soldiers and the transformative impact of Athenian democracy on traditional military 
ideology.169 Promising too have been important articles by three scholars, who 
address directly the relationship between Athenian politics and war. Victor Hanson 
considers the effect of democratic decision-making on Athenian military 
performance.170 To his credit Kurt Raaflaub has overcome the prevalence of Realist 
assumptions in our discipline in order to probe deeply the interplay between the 
imperialism of fifth-century Athens and ‘the political situation and psychology’ of its 
lower-class citizens, while Pierre Vidal-Naquet first sketched the intertwined 
histories of Athenian politics and warfare from the sixth to the fourth centuries.171 
However, the work of each scholar leaves something to be desired: Hanson largely 
postulates rather than proves the impact of democratic decision-making, Raaflaub 
relies on a straightforward military determinism which no longer seems valid (see 
part 7 below) and, in view of its publication forty years ago, the sketch of Vidal-
Naquet is somewhat out of date.   
 
166 For a critical survey of the modern historiography of ancient warfare, see Hanson 2007. 
Hanson writes (2007, 19): ‘Often the parameters of present investigations simply reflect old 
controversies of the nineteenth century while fruitful new fields of enquiry are left unexamined. For 
example, there are dozens of new treatments of traditionally narrow topics such as the hoplite push 
or the battle of Marathon while we still have no…wider enquiry into the role of ancient political 
organization – oligarchy, democracy and autocracy – on military efficacy.’ 
167 For studies of different wings, see, for example, Bugh 1988, Morrison and Coates 1986; 
Plassart 1913; Vos 1963. For general studies of a type of fighter, see, for example, Best 1969; 
Gaebel 2002; Hanson 1991; Trundle 2004.  
168 See most famously the four-volume study of the Peloponnesian War by Donald Kagan 
(Kagan 1969; 1974; 1981; 1987). For histories of military practices, see, for example, Lendon 2005; 
van Wees 2004; and especially Pritchett 1971-91.  
169 On the social background, see, for example, Ridley 1979; Spence 1993, 164-230; van 
Wees 2001; 2007. For the democratisation of military ideology, see, for example, Loraux 1986; 
Pritchard 1998a; 1998b.  
170 Hanson 2001, especially 16-24.  
171 Raaflaub 1994; 1996; 1998a; 2007b. Vidal-Naquet 1968. Quotation from Raaflaub 1994, 
138. For the prevalence of the Realist School’s assumptions in Ancient History, see Lendon 2002, 
375-6.  
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This lack of scholarly attention is a cause of some concern. The end of the Cold 
War has presented established democracies with a range of new security challenges, 
which have become more complex since the terrorist attacks of September 2001. 
Today governments are under strong public pressure to intervene in civil wars or 
failing states and are wrestling with how to reconcile open government, due legal 
process and personal liberty with the perceived demands of counterterrorism. In 
addition the United States and some of its allies are promoting democracy militarily 
in the Middle East and further a field. These deployments are exposing our soldiers to 
the risks of death, injury and post-traumatic stress, costing enormous sums but 
reaping mixed results.172 In these circumstances we should understand better than we 
do whether our democratic institutions are properly designed for the optimal 
development and execution of foreign policy and whether our democracy-promotion 
efforts are well conceived. The impact of democracy on Athenian war-making 
appears then to be an important problem for ancient historians:  it concerns a striking 
feature of Athenian history and its investigation would fill a gaping hole in our 
knowledge base and potentially stimulate critical thinking about issues of real 
contemporary relevancy.  
 The primary purpose of this edited collection is the exploring of this important 
problem from multiple perspectives. Taken together the chapters of its contributing 
ancient historians, archaeologists and classicists suggest that the political regime of 
classical Athens affected its war-making in two general but quite divergent ways. The 
democracy’s common dynamic of lower-class audiences and upper-class performers 
competing with each other led to a pronounced cultural militarism which encouraged 
the dmos to become hoplites or sailors in ever larger numbers and to initiate wars 
very frequently. This was partly counterbalanced by the regime’s highly competitive 
and public debating of war and peace which normally reduced the foreign-policy 
risks of this militarism, facilitated military innovations and efficiency, and helped 
develop the initiative of the Athenians on the battlefield. 
 Significantly the political debates, legal trials and dramatic competitions of 
classical Athens were the main forums for systematising and broadcasting the agreed 
communal identities and shared culture of its citizens, which have often been called 
‘civic ideology’.173 As lower-class citizens had the strongest influence on the 
 
172 Russett 2005, 395-401.  
173 Among other things they have been called ‘civic ideology’ (e.g. Goldhill 1986, 57, 70), 
‘Athenian identity and civic ideology’ (Boegehold and Scafuro 1994), ‘the Athenian imaginary’ 
(Loraux 1986), ‘the Athenian image of Athens’ or ‘conventional Athenian ideology’ (e.g. Mills 
1997, 48, 75, 83), and ‘a civic ideology…defined by public discourse’ (Ober 1994, 102) or in 
‘public conversations’ (e.g. Balot 2004a, 406). 
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democracy’s speeches and plays, civic ideology reflected their evaluations of 
themselves and others, particular points of view and perceived self-interests. Thus 
this ideology can be described as ‘popular thinking’ or ‘popular culture’ and 
Athenian plays and public speeches ‘popular literature’.174 Poor Athenian audiences 
understandably had a generally positive view of the military contributions of their 
own social class and hence showed preference for those public speakers and 
playwrights who employed the epic values and terminology of soldiering, which had 
been the preserve of Athenian aristocrats before the democracy, to describe the 
soldiering of rich and poor alike. Because lower-class citizens continued to be 
ashamed of their poverty, which rendered them unable to perform agatha or 
benefactions for the city and prone to behave immorally, this extension of traditional 
military ideology down the social scale made military participation particularly 
attractive to them as a source of public recognition and praise.   
 But this ascription of aret to non-elite Athenians serving as hoplites or sailors 
put them under new social pressure to initiate and join military campaigns. Like other 
behavioural norms of the ancient Greeks, courage had to be regularly proven by 
actions and recognised by others, while those who perceived themselves as agathoi or 
courageous felt aiskhun or a sense of shame to be accused of cowardice. A classical 
Athenian could be derided as a coward not only if he fled a battle in fear but also if he 
failed to endorse a war which seemed to be a necessity. As a consequence politicians 
regularly exploited ordinary citizens’ fear of shame to build popular support for their 
campaigns, even if this risked pressuring the dmos into voting for foreign-policy 
options which were ill-conceived and potentially disastrous for the city. In addition 
this extension of aret distorted the Athenians’ judgement of their own military 
record. The knowledge which most citizens had of the city’s history was based on 
their own experiences and the events which public speakers evoked in support of 
their proposals. Since military defeats were commonly put down to cowardliness (e.g. 
Demosthenes 60.21; Euripides Orestes 1475-88; Lysias 2.64-5; 10.28), the military 
setbacks of the Athenians tended to be slowly forgotten or, if rhetorically necessary, 
actively falsified. The result was that the Athenian dmos viewed their military 
history as an almost unbroken series of victories, which caused them to overestimate 
the likely success of proposed wars and to downplay their potential human-costs.  
 The open debating of foreign policy in the democracy may not have tempered 
the willingness of the Athenian dmos to be soldiers and to start wars but it did 
normally reduce the risk that they would endorse poorly conceived foreign-policy 
proposals. In the assembly politicians were free to make contentious arguments and 
 
174 E.g. Pritchard 1998a, 40; 1999a, 2-12; 2009, 216.  
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their intense rivalries with each other ensured that any proposal for war met opposing 
arguments and alternative options. This performance dynamic also promoted the 
efficient prosecution of ongoing campaigns, as politicians closely scrutinised the 
military expeditions which their rivals had successfully proposed and volunteered 
suggestions for their improvement (e.g. Thucydides 4.27). Lower-class Athenians 
welcomed this intense rivalry between politicians, because they remained suspicious 
of the motives of their political and military leaders and would personally be in 
harm’s way if a campaign which they were serving on proved to be poorly 
conceived.175 This adjudication of the frequent debates of foreign policy by the 
Athenian dmos constantly consolidated their general knowledge of foreign affairs, 
developed their ability to weigh up their sense of shame against practical 
considerations  and hence improved the overall quality of the decisions which they 
made between different foreign-policy proposals. In addition this high-order 
deliberative capacity of ordinary Athenians enabled them to see the merit of 
innovative solutions to military problems which strictly contradicted traditional 
morality or popular prejudices and to take more initiative as combatants than their 
non-democratic rivals (e.g. Plato Laws 706b-d).  
 
4. The Cultural Militarism of the Democracy 
The ideological democratisation of war which took place in fifth-century Athens 
can be observed most clearly in its regular public funeral for the war dead in which 
the epic concepts and language of soldiering and traditional mortuary practices of the 
upper class were extended to every citizen who had fought and died for the city (see 
part 1 above).176 This funeral probably dates back to the second quarter of the fifth 
century and was held every year when Athenians were killed in action (Thucydides 
2.34.1, 7-8).177 Its procession carried the ashes of the fallen from the marketplace, 
where they had been honoured for three days (2), to the public cemetery in the 
Ceramicus which was judged ‘the most beautiful suburb of the city’ (4-5; cf. 
Aristophanes Birds 395-9). An empty bier was carried for those dead sailors whose 
bodies could not be retrieved, while the remains of the others were housed in ten 
caskets (one for each tribe) which were made of cypress (Thucydides 2.34.3-4). This 
wood figured in the palaces of epic heroes and was thought to guarantee the 
 
175 For this suspicion, see, for example, Aristophanes Wasps 650-724; Peace 632-48, 668-9; 
Lysistrata 103, 490-1; Lysias 27.6-8; Ober 1989, 165-74; Okál 1960, 109-16; Roisman 2005, 120-
4; and the chapter by David Konstan in this volume.  
176 The following description draws heavily on Pritchard 1996, 137-8; 1999a, 224-33; and 
especially Loraux 1986, 15-42.  
177 Loraux 1986, 56-7; Parker 1996, 132-5; Pritchett 1971-91, volume 4, 100-24. 
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immortality of memory.178 At the public cemetery the coffins were placed in ‘a 
beautiful and grandiose tomb’ (Plato Menexenus 234c), which was thought to be 
beyond the reach even of a wealthy family (Xenophon Hellenica 2.4.17). Such tombs 
were adorned with statues of lions and friezes depicting groups of generic hoplites 
and cavalrymen vanquishing their enemies, both of which signified the aret of those 
being buried.179 They also had epigrams explaining that the dead had put their 
courage beyond doubt and left a deathless memory of it (e.g. IG I3 1179.3, 8-9; 
1162.48). Finally, each tomb displayed a complete list of the year’s casualties, 
including citizen sailors, which was organised by tribes (1142-93).180 That these 
casualty lists gave the same space to the name of every citizen, regardless of what his 
military rank and social class had been, reinforces the impression that the principle of 
democratic equality, which was central to the Athenians’ assessment of their own 
political capacities and rights, strongly shaped their honouring of the war dead.181 
Certainly this was how contemporaries saw it: a tragic fragment of the later fifth 
century had mythical Athenians who had died in battle for the city get a koinon or 
common tomb and isn or equal glory with many others (Euripides Erechtheus 
fragment 360.32-5 Collard, Cropp and Lee), while Demosthenes argued that the city 
judges ‘all’ of the war dead ‘equally’ worthy of ts auts tims or the same honour 
(18.208). Elsewhere compound words with isos and the idea of sameness were 
regularly employed to describe or justify the particular political equality of Greek 
democracy.182 
The epitaphios logos or funeral oration which was traditionally delivered after 
the burial of the war dead usually devoted much more space to the patriotic myths 
and unfailing aret of the Athenians and their ancestors than to the achievements of 
those who were actually being buried. Nonetheless these orations did spell out why 
the dead had gained what they called ‘the most becoming’ (Thucydides 2.44.1) or 
‘the most beautiful’ death (Plato Menexenus 248c). Their death in battle for the 
commonwealth or its worthy ideals resulted in ageless praise and ageless renown.183 
178 Loraux 1986, 349 n.26.  
179 See, for example, Parlama and Stampolidis 2001, no. 452; Pritchard 1999a, 91-2; 
Stupperich 1994; and the chapters by Polly Low and Robin Osborne in this volume. For the lion as 
a symbol of aret in Homer, see part 1 above.  
180 Elsewhere I gather the evidence for the inclusion of subhoplite citizens on these lists 
(Pritchard 1999a, 234-40), despite commonly expressed doubts (e.g. Hanson 1996, 306; Raaflaub 
1994, 141-2; 1996, 156; Strauss 1996, 313, 320-1). 
181 Pritchard 1999a, 231-2 pace Low 2003, 109; Rhodes 2003, 81. 
182 E.g. Aristotle Politics 1301a26-34; Euripides Suppliant Women 353, 407-8, 430-1, 438-41; 
Herodotus 3.142; Plato Menexenus 239a; Thucydides 6.38.5; Raaflaub 1996, 140.  
 183 E.g. Demosthenes 60.32; Hyperides Funeral Oration 27-8; Lysias 2.79; Plato Menexenus 
247d; Thucydides 2.43.2, 44.4 
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It gave them a deathless remembrance not only of their aret but also of their 
youthfulness, because their premature demise had spared them the ravages and 
disability of old age.184 
The funeral oration notoriously omitted or falsified military setbacks of the 
Athenians which would have confounded their preferred view of themselves as 
courageous and victorious.185 Sumio Yoshitake (chapter 14) carefully considers 
whether this high praise of the fallen represents another of the genre’s falsifications. 
For Plato the equal attribution of aret to the war dead was patently false; in his 
Menexenus he has Socrates remark sarcastically that a battlefield death is clearly a 
fine thing, as the dead soldier gets a fine tomb befitting of a great man, even if he is 
poor, and commendation, even if he is phaulos or morally reprehensible, and praise 
for ‘things which he did and did not possess’ (234c-e). But Yoshitake shows how the 
oration’s universal recognition of aret was much more justified than Plato here 
makes out. The classical Athenians had a surprisingly passive conception of courage: 
they believed the primary requirements of the agathos anr or courageous man were, 
firstly, to remain steadfast in battle and, secondly, to accept the possibility of personal 
injury or death when fighting for the city (see part 2 above). A sizeable number of 
those whom the city buried would not have met the first of these requirements, 
because many hoplites were killed after their phalanx had been routed, while taking 
to flight was a standard tactic in sea battles. Every dead hoplite or sailor, however, 
clearly met the second requirement; for they had demonstrably accepted the risk of 
life and limb in military service. By constantly stressing the mortal danger which the 
dead had faced and using the braving of kindunoi or dangers as a synonym for aret
the funeral orations implied that the dead’s meeting of this second requirement by 
itself justified the recognition of them as courageous men.  
 Those who died on the battlefield were not the only Athenian combatants to be 
described positively in the epic values and terminology of soldiering. In the surviving 
funeral orations, for example, the battles which are narrated reveal the Athenians as a 
whole and not just the war dead to be agathoi andres (e.g. Lysias 2.27, 52, 70; Plato 
Menexenus 245e-6a), who surpass all other Greeks in aret.186 Alternatively they 
make flattering generalisations about decades of Athenian war-making (e.g. 
Demosthenes 60.11). A good example is the summary of the Athenian empire by 
Lysias: as a result of their ‘very many toils (ponn), conspicuous contests (agonn)
184 E.g. Hyperides Funeral Oration 27-30, 42-3; Lysias 2.78-81; Demosthenes 60.32-3.  
185 For analysis of this feature of the genre, see Coventry 1989, 8; Loraux 1986, 132-71; 
Pritchard 1999a, 22-3; Thomas 1989, 231.  
186 E.g. Lysias 2.24, 33, 40, 44, 48-53, 57, 58, 61-2, 67-8; Plato Menexenus 239d, 240e-1a, 
243a, 243c-d; Demosthenes 60.6, 17-18, 21-3.  
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and outstanding dangers (kindunn)’, the Athenians made Greece free, ruled the sea 
for seventy years and brought political equality to their allies (2.55-6). Thus Plato’s 
specific comments on this aspect of the genre seem to be considerably more accurate, 
as Socrates tells his young companion (Menexenus 235a-b): ‘They laud the city by all 
means, those who died in war and our ancestors, all men who went before, and praise 
us too who are still alive. Being so praised by them, I for my part, Menexenus, am 
made to feel very noble.’  
 Critically the funeral oration makes no distinction between hoplites and sailors: 
victory at sea reveals Athenian aret no less than on land.187 Nor was this extension 
of traditional martial values to sailors confined to the public funeral. For example, in 
his Persians of the late 470s Aeschylus may have characterised the Athenians as 
hoplites and the Persians as archers (e.g. 26, 29, 85, 147-8, 237-8, 278-9, 556, 926, 
1020-2, 1025), but he still emphasized the aret of the Athenians who served as 
sailors in the city’s victory at Salamis (e.g. 357-60, 386-401).188 An epigram 
commemorating this victory praises ‘the courage of these men’ who ‘both as foot-
soldiers and on swift-moving ships protected the whole of Greece so that she would 
not witness the day of slavery’ (IG I3 503/4.1-4; cf. Palatine Anthology 7.258). 
Likewise Aristophanes sees ‘hard toil’ in fighting land battles, besieging cities and 
rowing (Wasps 684-5), while the Athenian general Phormio, apart from describing a 
sea battle as an agn (Thucydides 2.89.8, 10; cf. Aeschylus Persians 405), thinks it 
involves ‘dangers’ (11) and courage (3; cf. 2.86.4, 8-9) on the part of sailors.  
 This attribution of aret to sailors as a class was probably justified by the 
popular beliefs that military victory, firstly, was a consequence of courage and, 
secondly, secured by the efforts of every Athenian combatant rather than by the 
general alone.189 It sat very awkwardly, however, with the hoplite-based definition of 
courage, most of whose requirements sailors could never meet (see part 2 above). 
That upper-class speakers and playwrights nevertheless chose to affirm sailors’ aret
reminds us how Athenian popular culture was shaped by lower-class citizens and 
was, in fact, a sprawling cultural mélange in which incongruous and even 
 
187 E.g. Lysias 2.33, 40, 42-3, 47-8; Plato Menexenus 240e-1a, 242d-e, 243c-d. The surviving 
deliberative oratory of the fourth century does the same (e.g. Demosthenes 2.24; 3.23-6; 4.3-4; 9.36, 
40; 13.21-35). Roisman concludes (2005, 127 n.69): ‘…the oratorical corpus provides no evidence 
for the inferior ranking of rowing in comparison to hoplite or cavalry service.’  
188 Pritchard 1998b, 125-6; 1999a, 240-1. For this falsifying characterisation of the two sides, 
see Pritchard 1999a, 42-3, 124-5; Rosenbloom 2006, 48-9; and the chapter by Margaret Miller in 
this volume.  
189 For this first widely held belief, see, for example, Demosthenes 60.21; Hyperides Funeral 
Oration 15; Lysias 2.4-6, 20, 64-5; Plato Menexenus 240d; Pritchard 1999a, 97-8. For the second 
belief, see, for example, Aeschines 3.183-5; Euripides Andromache 693-8; Plutarch Cimon 8.1-2; 
Pritchard 1999a, 232-3.  
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contradictory ideas could subsist side by side.190 A large proportion of those 
participating in the democracy’s public forums served regularly as sailors, while 
other audience-members, even if they normally fought as hoplites, cavalrymen or 
lightly armed troops, sailed on the city’s warships either to get to distant battlefields 
or, occasionally, as conscripted sailors during naval emergencies. This second group 
may have identified primarily as one or another type of land-based soldier but there is 
some evidence which suggests that they possibly also thought of themselves as 
sailors when they were on board a warship.191 In view of these self-perceptions of 
their audiences upper-class public speakers and poets simply could not afford to deny 
or question the extension of aret to sailors if they wished to win their own agnes.
This positive representation of the military contributions of lower-class citizens 
contrasted markedly with the widely agreed evaluation of their social 
circumstances.192 Poor Athenians may have taken control of public life and civic 
ideology under the democracy but they were still ashamed of their poverty (e.g. 
Thucydides 2.40.1-2).193 Poverty was considered a disability, like old age or a 
physical handicap (e.g. Lysias 24.16-17), which resulted in socio-political 
disadvantages (e.g. Aristophanes Wealth 218-21; Demosthenes 21.141-2) and, at 
times, shameful acts and criminality (e.g. Aristophanes Wealth 565; Assembly-
Women 565-7, 667-8; Lysias 31.11). Poor citizens understandably longed to be 
wealthy one day.194 This negative view of their personal circumstances made warfare 
psychologically satisfying for a poor citizen. ‘In the military, Athenian men were able 
to meet the masculine expectations of courage, strength, fraternity, order, self-control, 
discipline, self-sacrifice, loyalty, and service to the state, and to defend Athens’s 
cherished ideals of justice and democracy.’195 In addition soldiering put lower-class 
citizens on the same level as upper-class citizens and the heroes of epic poetry. By 
reason of his military service a poor Athenian was recognised as khrstos polits (‘a 
useful citizen’) or khrsimos ti poli (‘useful to the city’).196 Thus fifth-century 
 
190 For this fractured character of Athenian popular culture, see Mills 1997, 72; Ober 1989, 
126, 224; Pelling 2000, 1-17; Pritchard 1998a, 44; 1999a, 12. 
191 Three surviving tragedies, for example, describe an individual hero who is clearly a hoplite 
as a nauts or naubats simply by reason of the fact that he has boarded a ship in order to be 
transported to or from a distant battlefield (Euripides Andromache 457; Sophocles Ajax 902; 
Philoctetes 246, 901).  
192 Pritchard 2005b, 22-3.  
193 Dover 1974, 109-12; Pritchard 1999a, 61-3; Rosivach 1991.  
194 E.g. Aristophanes Birds 592; Wealth 133-4; Thesmophoriazousai 289-90; Wasps 708-11.  
195 Roisman 2005, 105.  
196 E.g. Aeschines 1.11; Aristophanes Acharnians 595-7; Euripides Suppliant Women 886-7; 
Lysias 16.14; Sophocles Ajax 410; cf. Aristophanes Knights 943-4.  
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Athens gave its vast numbers of non-elite citizens compelling economic and cultural 
reasons to serve as hoplites or sailors.  
 But this flattering treatment of the soldiering of lower-class Athenians proved to 
be a double-edged sword. While a source of pride, it put them under new social 
pressure to authorise, and participate in, wars. Poor citizens may have welcomed the 
funeral orators’ characterisation of their aret as unsurpassed by any other people, but 
they also believed it was necessary to constantly prove their possession of this virtue 
on the battlefield and to be reminded of their duty to display it. Courage had heavy 
requirements and some individuals naturally struggled to meet them. Thus the 
Athenian dmos saw war as a way to put their aret beyond doubt and welcomed the 
regular calls to emulate the courageous exploits of their mythical and historical 
ancestors (e.g. Lysias 2.4-66; Plato Menexenus 239b-46a). In addition Athenian boys 
of both social classes were sent to the lessons of the grammatists or letter teacher 
where they memorised the exploits of Homer’s warriors, which, their fathers 
believed, would help turn them into agathoi andres or courageous men (e.g. 
Euripides Suppliant Women 911-17; Hyperides Funeral Speech 8-9).197 To be 
accused by others of falling short of the aret of the ancestors or of acting cowardly 
caused aiskhun or an intense feeling of shame.198 Although the Athenians associated 
courage and cowardice primarily with personal behaviour in battle, they also 
employed these terms less frequently to describe individuals who made important 
decisions in the lead up to a war. If someone, for example, who fled from the fray of 
battle out of fear could be called a coward, on the basis of analogy so too could a 
similarly motivated individual who refused to serve if he was conscripted or who 
failed to initiate a war which was necessary.199 Critically this extension of the terms’ 
application allowed Athenian politicians to regularly exploit the people’s fear of 
shame (also called aiskhun or aids) when trying to gain support for a proposed war 
(e.g. Aeschines 2.137-8; Thucydides 6.13.1). Since they claimed that their military 
ventures were indispensible, they could warn the dmos that rejection of what they 
proposed would be very shameful and make plain their cowardice and degeneration 
from the high standards of their forebears (e.g. Demosthenes 1-4, 6, 8-9). Such 
arguments had the potential to shut down scrutiny of foreign-policy proposals which 
were excessively dangerous or poorly conceived.200 
197 Pritchard 2003, 306-18.  
198 Roisman 2005, 65-7, 105-6, 111.  
199 For cowardice as the antithesis of bravery on the battlefield, see, for example, 
Aristophanes Clouds 354-5; Peace 1186-90; Euripides Suppliant Women 914-9; Plato Menexenus 
246b; IG I3 1179.6-13. For these extensions of its meaning, see, for example, Euripides Children of 
Heracles 700-1; Phoenician Women 999-1005; Suppliant Women 314-23; cf. Electra 983.
200 Balot 2004b.  
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Peter Hunt (chapter 9) attributes the decidedly rose-coloured view which the 
Athenian dmos had of their military history to the high value which they placed on 
military performance and explains how this view adversely affected their foreign-
policy decisions. We have already seen that the Athenians welcomed representations 
of their courage as outstanding and rehearsals of the courageous exploits of their 
ancestors. They did so not only because they demanded positive recognition of their 
soldiering but also, Hunt argues, because everyone agreed on the importance of 
military preparedness and fighting courageously in light of the external threats which 
Athens faced. Critically the knowledge which the vast majority of Athenians had of 
their shared history was based on their own memories, private conversations and the 
events which they heard public speakers evoke to meet various rhetorical ends.201 In 
this oral transmission of history episodes which contradicted prevailing values and 
self-perceptions were slowly forgotten or knowingly suppressed.202 Since military 
failure was traditionally attributed to cowardice, the defeat of an Athenian army was 
such an event which public speakers tiptoed around or, if that was not possible, 
actively falsified in order to preserve the idea of Athenian aret. While this flattering 
characterisation of Athenian war-making was reiterated across the public forums of 
the democracy, the falsification of history in its defence was most pronounced in the 
funeral oration which normally praised the city, consoled the bereaved and 
encouraged others to meet the Athenian standard of courage by rehearsing a long list 
of Athenian military achievements.203 Since this was the fullest account of the past 
which most Athenians would have encountered, its lack of candour about defeats 
encouraged them to imagine their military history as a series of isolated victories. 
Hunt concludes that this lopsided impression of the city’s military record, like the 
dmos’ reluctance to admit war’s human costs, distorted their assessment of the likely 
success and dangers of proposed military ventures.204 As a consequence the 
Athenians were unrealistically optimistic about military success and hence initiated 
wars more often than they otherwise would have done. 
 Polly Low (chapter 13) carefully evaluates what each element of the Athenian 
commemoration of the war dead signified and why their public tombs were 
mentioned so rarely in political debates. Athenian politicians evoked war-memorials 
of one kind or another as evidence of their ancestors’ aret, which, they regularly 
added, could only be matched by contemporary citizens if they accepted their 
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204 For the reluctance of the Athenian people to be reminded of fellow citizens killed in the 
prosecution of their wars, see the chapters by David Konstan and Polly Low in this volume.  
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proposals for starting wars (e.g. Demosthenes 3.23-5; 13.26; 19.271-2; 22.72-8). 
Alternatively they used them to criticise their fellow citizens for privileging the 
contributions of generals to victories (e.g. Aeschines 3.183-9; Demosthenes 20.112-
13). At face value the public tombs could have supported such arguments. They 
strongly evoked the aret of earlier Athenian soldiers and how the principle of 
democratic equality shaped the dmos’ assessment of individual combatants. In spite 
of this apparent rhetorical utility these monuments were rarely mentioned (e.g. 
Demosthenes 18.208; 57.37; Lycurgus 1.142). Instead politicians referred to the 
numerous dedications, buildings and religious celebrations which had been set up 
across the city to commemorate its victories.205 Low convincingly argues that the 
tombs of the war dead were passed over, because they complicated the rosy picture of 
Athenian military performance which the dmos preferred and were strongly 
associated with the unsettling lup (‘grief’) and penthos (‘mourning’) of the 
bereaved.206 It was at these tombs that relatives made the customary lamentations and 
offerings for their loved ones.207 As defeat was commonly taken as proof of 
cowardice, the fact that these tombs honoured those who died in defeat no less than 
those in victory rendered them much more problematical than other memorials as 
examples of Athenian courage.208 The reticence of Athenian politicians to evoke 
these tombs, Low concludes, bears out both the fragility of the Athenians’ view of 
themselves as unsurpassed in aret and how discussions of the human costs of battle 
could weaken arguments for waging a war.  
Tragedy and comedy’s portrayal of war was certainly more varied than the other 
genres of Athenian popular literature. Whereas politicians preferred triumphal 
accounts of the city’s military history, spoke constantly of Athenian courage and 
avoided mention of war’s human costs, Aristophanes, for example, staged three 
comedies ostensibly advocating or praising peace, while Euripides in Trojan Women 
and his other tragedies about the aftermath of the Trojan War focussed directly on the 
suffering of the defeated and the casualties and war crimes of the victors. These 
apparently anti-war plays have regularly been interpreted as an important counter 
weight to the pronounced militarism of Athenian popular culture: they provided, it is 
 
205 For these victory-commemorations, see Garlan 1995, 53-4; Hölschler 1998, 163-8; 
Raaflaub 2001, 323-8. 
206 For these emotions of the bereaved, see, for example, Demosthenes 60.32; Lysias 2.71-6; 
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207 See, for example, Demosthenes 60.37; Lycurgus 1.142; Plato Menexenus 249c; 
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said, direct criticism of the Athenians’ brutal treatment of cities, such as Melos, 
which they had captured by siege and the high value which they placed on waging 
war.209 
Theatre goers may have been moved by Euripides’ portrayal of the suffering of 
Trojan women and children, but, as Sophie Mills (chapter 6) points out, the tragic 
poets ensured that their audiences felt safely distanced from any unpleasantness on 
stage. Hence their dramatisations of unsettling topics were pushed back to the age of 
the heroes and set outside of Athens.210 Popular settings for such tragedies were 
Thebes and Sparta, against which fifth-century Athens was regularly at war.211 Plays 
set in these cities did not normally, as Euripides does in his Andromache (e.g. 324-5, 
435-59, 491, 595-601, 724-6), explicitly denigrate Thebans or Spartans.212 
Nevertheless the genre’s sustained representation of both as morally flawed and 
prone to commit injustice and impiety provided justification for the belligerence 
which the Athenian dmos maintained against these peoples.213 In Trojan Women 
Euripides pushed drama further away by putting the criticisms of war into the mouths 
of a group whom the Athenians normally viewed as doubly morally inferior, namely 
barbarian women. The accumulation of these distancing tendencies, Mills argues, 
would have discouraged theatre goers from linking this tragedy with recent events.  
 Their interpreting of Trojan Women as direct criticism of their own foreign 
policy was made still less likely by the genre’s very different characterisation of 
Athenian war-making. Mills puts it beyond doubt that the tragic poets simply 
confirmed the rosy view of Athenian foreign policy which was articulated most fully 
in the funeral orations. Indeed Euripides’ Children of Heracles, Erechtheus and 
Suppliant Women are ‘straight’ dramatisations of canonical myths of these speeches, 
which differ from the epitaphic tradition only by having democratic kings deliberate 
the pros and cons of military aid before taking the field (e.g. Children of Heracles 
253-87, 410-573; Suppliant Women 399-582).214 Such portrayals served as mythical 
paradigms not just for Athenian aret and interventionist foreign policy but also for 
the democracy’s new conception of courage as a virtue which required 
deliberation.215 
209 E.g. Gregory 1991, 98-100; Griffin 1998, 44; Rauflaub 2001, 329-41.  
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212 For Euripides’ treatment of Sparta in general, see Poole 1994. 
213 E. Hall 1989, 164; 1993, 113; Konstan 2007, 195; Loraux 1986, 68-9; Mills 1997, 52, 92; 
Pearson 1936, 38-9.  
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In the first two of his so-called anti-war plays Aristophanes made the case that 
the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War was a mistake for which Athens was mainly 
responsible, rehearsed some of its human costs and reminded his audience of peace’s 
many benefits. But David Konstan (chapter 7) makes clear that Acharnians (426/5) 
and Peace (422/1) were not the general critiques of Athenian war-making which 
many have assumed. These comedies do not blame the dmos for a conflict which is 
characterised as unjustified; rather, they portray poor Athenians as ever ready for 
military action and as performing their military service diligently (e.g. Aristophanes 
Acharnians 540-56, 598-617). Konstan suggests that this picture is consistent with 
old comedy’s generally positive evaluation of war-making: Aristophanes indicates, 
for example, that soldiering and military spending were standard practice (e.g. Birds 
1368-9; Knights 1350-3), that the veterans of Marathon were models of courage (e.g. 
Acharnians 696-7; Knights 781, 1334), that the city owed its safety to the navy and 
its sailors (e.g. Acharnians 162-3; Birds 378-80; Wasps 1070-3) and that the empire 
was normally a just hegemony which protected its subjects (e.g. Knights 1320; Peace 
929-36). In these two plays Aristophanes, in fact, took care to absolve lower-class 
Athenians of responsibility for the Peloponnesian War, blaming instead their 
politicians for its outbreak and needless prolongation (Acharnians 515-19; Peace 
668-9; cf. Knights 1356-7). His protagonists suggest that for undisclosed personal 
reasons Pericles advocated the embargo on Megara, which pushed Sparta into war, 
while his successors kept the war going, for the sake of enriching themselves, by 
enflaming the people’s hatred of the enemy (Acharnians 497-626; Peace 605-69). 
While these plays had no discernible impact on the city’s foreign policy, their 
depiction of politicians hoodwinking the people, which appears to have been a 
commonplace which old comedy shared with contemporary political debate (e.g. 
Knights 716-18, 779-80, 801-4, 826-7; Wasps 650-724; Lysias 16.17), presumably 
encouraged lower-class citizens, when sitting in the assembly, to scrutinise their 
leaders’ proposals for war as thoroughly as possible.216 
Konstan considers, finally, how the third of Aristophanes’ so-called anti-war 
plays reveals the limits of the genre’s questioning of foreign policy. As the city was 
grimly determined to fight on after its enormous losses in the disastrously ill-
conceived Sicilian expedition  (e.g. Thucydides 8.1), Aristophanes, it seems, felt that 
a call for peace on the part of able-bodied citizens, as he had done previously, might 
be viewed as cowardly defeatism and hence played it safe by making his advocates 
for peace Greek women, whose perceived lack of courage and political capacity made 
it possible for men in the audience to discount their advice as comic license or bland 
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utopianism.217 In addition his Lysistrata of 412/11 confirms that not even comedy 
could overcome the Athenians’ deep aversion to acknowledging their own losses, as 
its eponymous heroine is prevented from making what would have been the genre’s 
only explicit reference to Athenian casualties (588-90; cf. 37-8; Peace 647-56).218 
Tragedy and comedy, when viewed as a whole, did not counterbalance the 
manifestly pro-war bias of Athenian popular culture. Sometimes their productions 
served as ‘safe’ opportunities to represent war’s human costs or peace’s 
advantages.219 But these genres also confirmed aret and military service as norms, 
reinforced the characterisation of Athenian war-making as essentially just, helped 
besmirch the enemy’s morality and reminded the dmos of the importance of open 
debate for sound foreign policy. In so doing both oiled rather than hindered the 
Athenian war machine. 
Three of the volume’s chapters explore the complex and ever-changing 
relationship between depictions of Athenian soldiers on privately purchased works of 
art and the treatment of military affairs in the democracy’s popular culture. Robin 
Osborne (chapter 10) shows how the private funerary sculpture of the later fifth and 
early fourth centuries was, at first, constrained by, and, then, helped transform, the 
norms for recognising the military achievements of individual Athenians. For most of 
the fifth century the principle of democratic equality strongly shaped how the 
Athenians thought of soldiering. They believed that every combatant was equally 
responsible for victory and hence were reluctant to single out generals for special 
honours. Likewise the funeral orations and epigrams for the war dead distributed 
aret equally, while the reliefs on their public tombs depicted, not individuals, but 
groups of generic hoplites and cavalrymen vanquishing their enemies. In the late fifth 
century this egalitarianism became less rigid: the casualty lists now singled out 
individuals for special mention and some wealthy families commissioned funerary 
reliefs in which their loved ones were depicted as soldiers. In both instances, 
however, care was taken not to represent any individual as more courageous than 
others. The lists included, not proofs of outstanding individual aret (as a near-
contemporary casualty-list of Thespiae did, for example, by noting sporting victors), 
but the military offices which some had held at the time of their death (e.g. e.g. IG I3
217 For this perceived lack of courage and political capacity, see, for example, Aeschylus 
Agamemnon 1401; Aristophanes Lysistrata 516-20, 587-8; Lysias 2.5; Pritchard 2004b, 183-4.  
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1186.79-80), while the reliefs showed soldiers standing quietly instead of acting 
courageously in the fray of battle.220 
For Osborne this barrier against singling out individuals for aret was first 
punctured in 394/3, when the Athenians, after a decade of relative quiet, sustained 
heavy casualties in the first battles of the Corinthian War. In response the dmos 
revived the practice of publicly burying the war dead (IG II2 5221). But one bereaved 
family, not thinking this enough, set up their own relief for their son, Dexileos, who, 
while fighting as a cavalryman, had died at the tender age of twenty years.221 They 
believed his death confounded longstanding doubts about the aret of cavalrymen, 
which had grown much stronger because of the corps’ support of the violent 
oligarchy of the Thirty a decade earlier.222 If his death could be marked by a fighting 
horseman on a public tomb, they believed that they were entitled to represent him 
similarly on his own relief. Nonetheless they apparently sought to mitigate negative 
reactions to the relief; for its inscription indicates that their son was only a child 
during the Thirty’s reign and had been one of five horsemen who had fallen in the 
same battle.223 This work of art encouraged many other families to commemorate the 
aret of loved ones on funerary reliefs. Osborne readily acknowledges this change in 
mortuary practice was only one part of the democracy’s long-term re-assessment of 
citizens’ individual contributions. But his chapter makes abundantly clear that 
cultural change does involve individual choices and individual events and often 
proceeds in fits and bursts. 
 By providing a funeral and collective tomb for the war dead and honouring them 
annually through contests and sacrifices fifth-century Athens appropriated the 
traditional obligations of close relatives to bury their kin and assiduously tend their 
graves.224 In these public rites the bereaved were pushed to the margins.225 The 
funeral orators may have noted in passing their lup and penthos, but consistently 
urged them to restrict these troubling emotions as best as they could by remembering 
the aret which the war dead had put beyond doubt and the material support which 
the city would give those relatives whom they had left behind.226 The involvement of 
the bereaved was limited to the leaving of offerings for their dead relatives during the 
 
220 This later-fifth-century list from Thespiae describes one of the war dead as a victor at the 
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public ekphora or pre-burial display of their remains and the lamenting of their own 
relatives beside the grave (e.g. Thucydides 2.34.2, 46.2). Red-figure loutrophoroi 
apparently were popular offerings for the war dead.227 Fragments of such ritual water 
vessels have been found in a recent excavation of a collective tomb, while another 
fragment depicts the casualty lists which graced these monuments.228 Patricia Hannah 
(chapter 12) explores what the most common scenes on these so-called warrior 
loutrophoroi signified and how these vessels were traditionally used in a family’s 
preparing of a corpse for burial and as grave-markers or -goods. These serve as rare 
evidence, she suggests, for the decidedly mixed emotions of the bereaved and their 
ongoing sense of obligation, despite the public funeral, to perform the rites which a 
family traditionally undertook for its dead. For Hannah this series also reflects basic 
military realities; for the changes in its iconography of a hoplite’s kit vividly 
illustrates the shift towards lighter and less extensive armour over the course of the 
fifth century, which was probably brought about by the desire of increasing numbers 
of poorer citizens to serve as hoplites.  
 In 1975 Konrad Schauenberg published a red-figure oinochoe or wine jug which 
depicted an essentially naked man, firmly grasping his penis in his right hand, on the 
point of anally penetrating a Persian archer.229 Between the two figures an inscription 
was added: ‘I am Eurymedon. I stand at the ready in a bent-over position.’ 
Eurymedon was of course the river where Athenian sailors and hoplites achieved 
back-to-back victories over the Persians in 466 or thereabouts (Plutarch Cimon 12.1-
13.2; Thucydides 1.100.1-2). Many have interpreted this wine jug as a crude 
evocation of how the Athenians of the time were accounting for their military success 
against the Great King: they were manly and courageous, while the Persians were 
naturally effeminate and cowardly.230 Margaret Miller (chapter 13) carefully critiques 
this longstanding interpretation. As part of this morality-based explanation of 
Athenian military success Athenian pottery-painters and tragic poets sought to 
portray the Athenians essentially as hoplites and the Persians as archers.231 But on 
this oinochoe the Greek lacks any hoplite-arms and is marked out iconographically as 
a sailor. He also falls well short of the standard of the respectable citizen: his scanty 
goatee and sideburns, unkempt hair and tribn (‘poor man’s cloak’) are the normal 
attribute of lowly figures, such as labourers and slaves, on finely painted pots, while 
 
227 Stupperich 1994, 97. 
228 Blackman 1998, 8-11; Bradeen 1967, 324-5; Stoupa 1997.  
229 Schauenberg 1975; Museum for Art and Industry (Hamburg), inv. no. 1981.173.  
230 Cartledge 1999, 56-61; E. Hall 1993, 110-13.  
231 See Bovon 1963 and n.183 above.  
Page 45 
 
his attempted buggery of an older and foreign man confounds the mannered 
homosexuality of the Athenian upper class.  
This decidedly unsympathetic view of sailors was not shared by the Athenian 
dmos. While they may have preferred the heroic language of land battle for lauding 
their combatants, we have already seen how they publicly recognised the aret of 
sailors. For Miller this wine jug gives us a rare glimpse of the dismissive attitude 
which some upper-class Athenians of the time presumably had of the city’s 
burgeoning navy and its personnel. While not directly attested for the 460s, the 
existence of such a minority view is very likely: in the later fifth and fourth centuries 
upper-class critics of the democracy disparaged sailors or considered sea power 
morally corrupting, while, in the early 450s, a minority of Athenians were seeking to 
overthrow the democracy and opposed its building of long walls down to the sea 
(Thucydides 1.108.4-7).232 But evoking this minority view was clearly not a 
commercial success, as this wine jug’s scene is unparalleled. The upper- and lower-
class customers of the pottery workshops may have preferred images of hoplites 
rather than warships, but few, it seems, wanted scenes denigrating sailors.  
 
5. The Democratic Debating of Foreign Policy 
 
Ryan Balot (chapter 3) explains that the open debates of the Athenian 
democracy normally reduced the risk which its cultural militarism posed to the 
soundly based determination of foreign policy. Athenian politicians were free to be 
contentious and their intense rivalries with each other guaranteed that any proposal 
for war would meet with opposing arguments and alternative proposals. As a 
consequence the Athenian dmos, when weighing up foreign-policy proposals, were 
also encouraged to consider what was in their longer-term interests and the practical 
value of just international relations. The failure of Cleon in 427, for example, to 
convince the Athenians to execute every last Mytilenean (Thucydides 3.36-50) and of 
Demosthenes, before the mid-340s, to shame them into accepting his risky proposals 
for war against Philip of Macedon show how soundly based calculations of self-
interest did regularly carry the day.233 Balot suggests that this ability of the Athenians 
to balance fear of shame against strategy saw them develop forms of combat which 
strictly broke the conventions of phalanx warfare, while their direct involvement in 
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the city’s decision-making made them more innovative and flexible than the 
combatants of oligarchies and autocracies.  
 Significantly Balot shows how the Athenians actually invented a second and 
more nuanced standard of courage and new mythical paradigms which reflected the 
democracy’s wide-ranging debates of foreign policy. The truly courageous, it could 
now be argued, were those who went to war after open debate, whereas those 
thoughtlessly risking their lives only displayed rashness (e.g. Demosthenes 14.8-9; 
Hyperides fragment A4 Burtt; Thucydides 2.40.2-3). On the tragic stage Theseus and 
other heroes of Athenian mythology deliberated thoroughly before taking the field, 
balancing the demands of courage, strategy and justice (e.g. Euripides Suppliant 
Women 160-348).234 These abstract representations of the practical integration of 
courage and deliberation by the Athenian people weakened further the potency of 
shame as a motivation for war and hence consolidated their capacity to make well-
considered decisions about foreign policy. 
 Admittedly the intense competition of Athenian politics and the suspicion which 
the dmos had of their political and military leaders could be a mixed blessing when 
it came to the actual conduct of campaigns which the democracy had authorised. 
While this performance dynamic helped ensure that wars were prosecuted efficiently, 
it also led to the legal prosecution, ostensibly for bribery or treason, of one or two of 
the city’s stratgoi or generals on average in any one year.235 As many of these trials 
ended in death-sentences, Athenian stratgoi, because of their fear of such 
punishment, endeavoured to carry out as closely as possible the directives which the 
dmos gave them for their campaigns.236 Such prosecutions may occasionally have 
deprived the city of competent leadership which it sorely needed (e.g. Diodorus 
13.101-2; Xenophon Hellenica 1.7.1-35) or caused generals not to take the best 
course of action out of fear (e.g. Thucydides 7.11-15, 48), but they did, at least, 
effectively address the so-called principle–agent problem which bedevils collective 
enterprises.237 Thus the popular courts helped guarantee that the advantages which the 
Athenians gained from the open debate and constant review of foreign policy in the 
assembly were not lost through a failure to implement decrees in the field.  
Iain Spence (chapter 4) argues that the Athenian decision of the later 440s or 
early 430s to create Greece’s largest cavalry-corps outside of Thessaly represents 
another prime example of this soundly based and innovative decision-making of the 
Athenian dmos. In doing so lower-class Athenians overcame, in this instance, not a 
 
234 See also the chapter by Sophie Mills in this volume.  
235 Hamel 1998b, 122-60; Hansen 1991, 218-20.  
236 Hamel 1998b, 159.  
237 Ober 2008b, 15-16.  
Page 47 
 
feeling of shame, but their own expectations of the upper class and popular prejudices 
against members of the armed forces’ smaller corps. Spence details how this trebling 
of regular horsemen to one thousand was only made possible by significantly 
reducing the private costs which individuals bore so that less affluent members of the 
upper class could be convinced to join up (Xenophon Cavalry-Commander 1.9-12). 
The democracy achieved this by providing a katastasis or setting-up loan for a 
horseman’s purchase of his war-horse and a misthos or daily wage to cover, among 
other things, the sitos or grain for his and his groom’s mounts. In the late 430s this 
military pay alone probably consumed more than one tenth of the city’s annual 
income.238 Such an enormous subsidy ran counter to the popular belief, which the 
dmos otherwise acted on (e.g. Pseudo-Xenophon 1.13, 2.9-10), that elite citizens 
were obliged to support public services as generously as possible.239 In supporting 
this policy they also had to downplay slurs about the aret of horsemen. We have 
already seen how cavalrymen fell well short of the prevailing definition of courage: 
they employed flight as a tactic and faced significantly lower personal risks than 
hoplites. Since lower-class Athenians never fought as regular members of this corps 
and presumably welcomed a convenient foil against which their own battlefield-
behaviour measured up favourably, they allowed public speakers and playwrights to 
cast aspersions on the aret of those who chose service as a horseman rather than as a 
heavily armed soldier.240 
Clearly the decision of the Athenian people to treble the size of the cavalry-
corps, along with their perception of it as a strategic asset (e.g. Andocides 3.5, 7; 
Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus 694-719), were soundly based. Spence explains, for 
example, that the ability of the Peloponnesian forces to penetrate so deeply into 
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Attica, during their invasion of 446, revealed the shortcomings of the city’s defence 
of its khra (Thucydides 1.114.2), while the expanded cavalry-corps did effectively 
harass the Spartans and their allies and hence reduce the destructiveness of their 
invasions of Attica during the Peloponnesian War (e.g. 2.22; 7.27.5).241 Indeed he 
plausibly suggests that the corps’ expansion may have been part of deliberate 
preparations for the island strategy whose implementation Pericles oversaw at the 
beginning of this war (see part 2 above). Certainly this sophisticated strategic 
thinking on the part of the Athenian people was reflected in the abstract discussions 
of dunamis (‘military power’) and its requirements in the plays and speeches of the 
late fifth and fourth centuries.242 But Spence suggests, in conclusion, that it appears 
even earlier in the blatantly anachronistic treatment of the Persian Wars by the 
historians (e.g. Herodotus 7.139, 235; Thucydides 1.72-4).  
Archers and other psiloi or lightly armed soldiers also failed to meet the hoplite-
based conception of courage in classical Athens, because they too typically employed 
flight as a tactic and discharged their arrows, javelins or spears at the greatest 
possible distance from the enemy (see part 2 above). As only a small fraction of 
lower-class Athenians ever served as archers, the dmos also welcomed their 
playwrights and politicians’ condemnation of them as cowards.243 In addition service 
as a psilos was strongly associated with so-called barbarians, whom the Athenians 
believed to be completely incapable of acting courageously. There was, from the 
mid-sixth century, a long history of hiring Thracians and Scythians as lightly armed 
soldiers at Athens (see part 1 above), while we have seen how the Persians were 
represented as archers in the tragedies of fifth-century Athens and on its finely 
painted pots. As was the case with the city’s cavalrymen, Matthew Trundle (chapter 
5) makes abundantly clear that these popular prejudices did not prevent classical 
Athenians from deploying lightly armed troops and doing so in innovative ways. 
Athens, for example, broke from the other cities of central Greece by establishing its 
own corps of toxotai (‘archers’) in the late 480s, doubled its size mid-century, began 
publicly recruiting foreign peltasts in the 420s, armed rowers as psiloi for raiding 
parties around the same time and began using peltasts as its main force on distant and 
year-round campaigns in the first decades of the next century. In every instance, 
Trundle establishes, these developments addressed clear military problems or gave 
the Athenians a tactical edge over their enemies. Thus we have here further examples 
of the soundly based and innovative decision-making of the Athenian people with 
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respect to foreign policy. This is particularly evident, Trundle concludes, in the 
reformed ephbeia of the later 330s and 320s, in which the city’s future hoplites, who 
had sworn to uphold the traditional requirements of courage, were nonetheless trained 
to fight, when necessary, as archers, peltasts and javelin-throwers (Ath. Pol. 42.2-
5).244 
Alastair Blanshard (chapter 8) examines the effect of the democracy’s law-court 
on the way in which the Athenians conducted and judged their military activities. His 
close analysis of several surviving speeches from the fourth century strongly suggests 
that the law-courts played roles which were no less significant than the assembly in 
the people’s control of foreign policy and popular culture and their endorsement of 
military innovations. Decisions about war and peace may only have been taken in the 
assembly, but military affairs still figured prominently in the law-court. Lower-class 
jurors, for example, adjudicated the dokimasia or pre-appointment scrutiny of each 
magistrate, in which a candidate’s fulfillment of military obligations was carefully 
checked (Ath. Pol. 55.3).245 In addition litigants normally brought up past military 
service either to prove their own good citizenship or to besmirch that of their 
opponents (e.g. Aeschines 2.167-9; Lysias 10.28). Blanshard reminds us that litigants 
knew that their opponents would exploit every opportunity to characterise them as 
having fallen short of community standards of military service and faced serious 
consequences, especially as defendants, if they lost their cases.246 Consequently 
litigants, like politicians debating foreign policy, often complicated the simple 
application of popular morality to a given set of facts by introducing other 
considerations which, they believed, their lower-class audiences would recognise as 
valid (e.g. Lysias 9). In so doing they often reinforced existing popular anxieties 
about one or another military practice or drew attention to some new problem with 
the armed forces. Indeed Blanshard details how two major military reforms of the 
fourth century directly addressed problems which had been canvassed earlier in a 
law-court (e.g. [Demosthenes] 50). While a direct link between these reforms and 
speeches cannot be established, legal agnes, it seems, played an important part in 
building majority support for military innovations. Not all litigants, however, could 
sidestep questions about their military morality by pointing to such problems. In these 
circumstances, Blanshard concludes, upper-class defendants had no option but to 
deny any aspersions against them, demonstrate their aret and endorse explicitly the 
prejudices of the jurors, even if they were directed against their own social class.  
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6. Athenian War-Making in the Fourth Century 
Together the chapters of this edited volume provide what is a strong case that 
democracy was a major cause of the intensification and transformation of Athenian 
war-making in the fifth century. In addition they go a reasonably long way to 
illuminating the substance of this causal relationship by detailing how particular 
aspects of the Athenians’ popular culture and political practices may have impacted 
on specific features of their military affairs. However, they do not attempt to judge 
the importance of democracy relative to the other two major causes of the Athenian 
military revolution, namely demography and imperial income. By treating fourth-
century Athens as a separate unit of study this ambiguity can be effectively 
addressed. Social scientists have shown how the comparison of one example of a 
particular phenomenon with several causes with another example where one or more 
of these independent variables are absent helps determine the relative weight of the 
causes in the first unit of study.247 Athens of the fourth century was a democracy, 
possibly had the same-sized citizen-body as in the sixth century, but lacked the 
enormous imperial income of the fifth century.248 Traditionally the population-losses 
during the Peloponnesian War and the collapse of the income-bearing empire were 
thought to have caused a wholesale decline in its war-making.249 It has long been 
argued that the dmos of postwar Athens initiated fewer wars and were reluctant to 
serve personally when they did so. As a result, mercenaries had to be employed in 
increasingly large numbers and soon formed the core of the city’s armed forces. The 
massive reduction in state income often prevented Athens from launching the fleets 
which were required to defend its strategic interests. In making this interpretation 
ancient historians of the twentieth century took at face value the negative comments 
which Demosthenes made about Athenian warfare in his assembly speeches of the 
late 350s and 340s. As part of his efforts to convince the dmos to wage war against 
Philip of Macedon Demosthenes repeatedly suggested that their military behaviour 
fell short of the high standard of their fifth-century ancestors and hence was a cause 
of shame (e.g. Demosthenes 1-4, 6, 8-9).250 
Over the last quarter of a century the close study of the actual performance of 
fourth-century Athens has largely overturned the bleak view of wholesale decline: 
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Athens recovered quickly from the Peloponnesian War, strengthened its democracy, 
became a cultural innovator again and restored its record of military innovation and 
success.251 This work has corroborated the earlier doubts which were occasionally 
expressed about the reliability of Demosthenes as a reporter of military affairs.252 In 
particular Leonhardt Burckhardt has demonstrated exhaustively that for the Athenian 
armed forces ‘mercenaries were only an important supplement’.253 Admittedly these 
foreign troops had long served as lightly armed specialists who fought alongside the 
regular army and were increasingly employed for sieges and year-round campaigns, 
in which citizens found it difficult to participate because of their social 
responsibilities.254 Additionally the acute population losses of the later fifth century 
did make it necessary for upper-class trierarchs, despite the smaller size of fourth-
century fleets, to hire non-citizen rowers for their crews. But the backbone of the 
armed forces of Athens remained its citizens. Throughout the fourth century Athenian 
hoplites and horsemen regularly fought pitched battles in central Greece where their 
fighting was decisive for the outcome (e.g. Xenophon Hellenica 3.5.18-22; 4.2.16-23, 
3.15-20).255 Athenians also kept coming forward for naval service in reasonably large 
numbers (e.g. [Demosthenes] 50.29; Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.61).256 The Athenian 
dmos, in fact, waged war more often in the fourth century than previously: they 
campaigned incessantly from 396 to 386 and then from 378 to 338 with only year-
long interruptions.257 
In this century Athens manifestly ‘still ruled the waves’: it normally could put to 
sea the fleets which were necessary to protect its shipping-lines to the Black Sea, 
which were vital for its grain-supply (Demosthenes 18.301-2; Xenophon Hellenika 
5.4.61), and was widely recognised as Greece’s leading sea power (e.g. Demosthenes 
6.12; 8.45; Diodorus 15.78.4; Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.1).258 Clearly too the highly 
competitive debates of the democracy helped fourth-century Athenians to identify 
and effectively address foreign-policy challenges.259 An early example is their 
securing of allies to fight the Spartans during the 370s. The Corinthian War ended 
badly for the Athenians: the Persians and Spartans joined forces to capture their grain 
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ships and hence forced them to accept the King’s Peace of 387/6 (Xenophon 
Hellenica 5.1.31). This recognised the Greek city-states of Asia as Persian subjects, 
insisted on the autonomy of the other Greeks, which checked the ongoing efforts of 
the Athenians to reconstitute their fifth-century empire (e.g. Andocides 3.15, 36; 
Xenophon Hellenica 3.5.10), and promised massive military retaliation against any 
state which broke the peace.260 Since the Spartans used this autonomy clause to 
continue their aggressive interventions in the affairs of other poleis (e.g. Xenophon 
Hellenica 5.2.1-10, 20-31), Athens needed to address its military vulnerability as a 
matter of urgency and to do so within these new constraints. Thus it struck bilateral 
alliances with maritime centres which explicitly acknowledged the King’s Peace (e.g. 
IG II2 34-5, 41) and, after a failed attempt on the part of the Spartan, Sphrodias, to 
capture the Piraeus in 378/7, invited peoples which were not Persian subjects to 
become members of the so-called Second Athenian League (43).261 The Athenians 
promised not to impose a garrison, imperial magistrate and phoros (‘tribute’) on those 
who joined, to respect their constitution and to abstain from purchasing or 
expropriating their properties (43.15-45). This renouncing of the policies of their 
earlier arkh with respect to new allies addressed the fear which many Greeks 
understandably still had of Athenian intentions and signalled to the Great King that 
league-members would indeed be ‘free and autonomous’ (19-20). These promises, 
which were largely kept, proved effective: membership quickly swelled to around 
sixty or seventy states (79-134; Aeschines 2.70; Diodorus 15.30.2), whose harbours 
and military contributions helped the Athenians to restore their naval supremacy by 
forcing Sparta to the negotiating table (e.g. Xenophon Hellenica 6.2.1-2, 3.18-19).262 
Unsurprisingly an important area of reform throughout the fourth century was 
the financing of war. The Athenians, for example, when they were carefully 
preparing for all-out war against Sparta in 378/7, reformed their collection of the 
eisphora or extraordinary war tax and, in the course of the ensuing hostilities, gained 
the approval of their league’s sunedrion or council to collect regular suntaxeis or 
contributions from its members.263 Another significant reform in this area was the 
reorganising of the recruitment of trierarchs in 358/7.264 Such financial reforms 
helped to ensure that Athens once again could spend more on its armed forces than all 
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other public activities combined. In the 370s and 360s, for example, the Athenians 
directed no less than 500 talents of public and private money each year on average 
towards their armed forces.265 
Mid-century the Athenians also introduced a new age-based system for 
conscripting hoplites to tackle the perceived unfairness of the old one (e.g. Lysias 9), 
while in 336/5, a few years after their defeat at Chaeronea, they took the disconnected 
and chronically underfunded exercises of some wealthy eighteen- and nineteen-year-
old Athenians and transformed them into a state-sponsored and two-year training 
programme for the city’s future hoplites.266 For each recruit in this reformed ephbeia 
or cadetship the city provided elements of the hoplite panoply, daily maintenance and 
probably also accommodation (Ath. Pol. 42.2-4). First-year ephboi or ephebes were 
stationed in the Piraeus where they trained in a variety of combat roles, while second-
year cadets patrolled Attica and manned its guard posts (3-4). Tellingly the 
proportion of Athenians who chose to take up this demanding training was 
considerably higher than the 30 percent who were available for active service as 
hoplites at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (see part 2 above). The lists of 
those who had completed their two years of ephebic service on honorary decrees of 
the 330s and 320s point to around 500 nineteen-year-olds doing so every year.267 As 
there were around 990 nineteen-year-old Athenians in any one year of the later fourth 
century, it seems that about 50 percent of the newly registered demesmen were now 
choosing to serve as heavily armed soldiers.268 It is not easy to say whether the 
ephebic reform alone was responsible for this large increase in the participation-rate 
of Athenians as hoplites or whether it consolidated a gradual increase which had 
occurred over the previous century. But this high rate of participation in the ephbeia 
of these decades certainly proves that fourth-century Athenians were no less willing 
than their fifth-century ancestors to fight and die for the city.  
Clearly the war-making of fourth-century Athens was not qualitatively different 
from its previous record: the Athenian dmos served as hoplites and sailors in large 
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numbers, started wars more frequently than before, undertook military reforms, and 
successfully kept wars away from their city and its countryside for most of the 
period.269 That this renewed military success occurred in spite of the smaller 
population-base and the lack of imperial income strongly suggests that it was indeed 
democracy which was the most important cause of the military revolution of fifth-
century Athens.  
 
7. The Other Direction of the Causal Symbiosis: The Effects of 
Military Affairs on Athenian Democratisation 
 
The chapters of this edited collection explore the impact of the Athenian 
democracy on war-making but they leave to others the substantial opportunities for 
new research into the other direction of this causal symbiosis, namely the impact of 
military affairs on Athenian democratisation. For nearly a century ancient historians 
agreed that the emergence and consolidation of Athenian democracy were caused by 
extensions of military participation.270 Our discipline accepted the testimony of 
Aristotle that the sudden appearance of phalanx-based battles in the mid-seventh 
century compelled elites to involve in their military ventures prosperous non-elite 
citizens, who quickly demanded more popular forms of government in recognition of 
their new military contributions (e.g. Aristotle Politics 1297b16-28).271 Also widely 
accepted was the proposition of Aristotle and other philosophers that the fifth-century 
consolidation of Athenian democracy was a consequence of the demands of 
subhoplite citizens for greater political rights, whose military service had been made 
possible by the creation of a large navy (e.g. 1274a11-14, 1304a22-4).272 
In the last decade, however, the purported evidence for this straightforward 
military determinism has been increasingly called into question. Aristotle may be the 
recognised founder of Comparative Politics but his reliability as a source for early 
Greek history is now seriously doubted.273 Among others, his comments on the so-
called hoplite revolution are internally contradictory and historically inaccurate. The 
recent identification of mass fighting in the eighth-century poetry of Homer strongly 
suggests that the hoplite phalanx resulted – not from a destabilising revolution – but 
from slow, incremental changes in tactics and weaponry.274 We have also seen how in 
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Athens, before 508/7, hoplites remained predominantly upper class, while any major 
impact of military activity on political change is unlikely in view of the infrequency 
and small scale of sixth-century campaigns (see part 1 above). Finally the linking of 
democracy and sea power has been shown to be a purely ideological construction, 
which was forged for polemical purposes by Pseudo-Xenophon, Plato and other 
philosophical critics of the Athenian democracy.275 There is simply no evidence that 
non-elite Athenians ever believed their legal and political equality were a result of 
their ability to contribute militarily to the city.276 
With this discrediting of military determinism ancient historians and political 
scientists can no longer explain why Athenian democracy emerged and went from 
strength to strength. As Athens is the most fully developed democracy of pre-modern 
times and our best documented example of a participatory or direct democracy in any 
period of world history, new research into this process of democratisation seems a 
matter of some urgency for our discipline. A good place of departure for this research 
would be the democratic revolution of 508 and the reforms of Cleisthenes. The latter 
may have brought democracy and strong state structures to Athens for the first time, 
but they were not (as is regularly suggested) the product of upper-class ‘social 
engineering’ and hence ‘a vision from above, not below’.277 Our sources put it 
beyond doubt that his reforms were only enacted because of the unprecedented 
collective actions of the Athenian people: they were made possible by the popular 
uprising of 508/7 (Ath. Pol. 20.1-4; Herodotus 5.66, 96-7) and only survived because 
of the immediate commitment of ordinary Athenians to the new democracy 
(Herodotus 5.66, 96-7) and its defence militarily (74-7). This activism on the part of 
non-elite citizens presupposes that they already had a common identity as Athenians 
and strong political aspirations, which would have taken much of the sixth century to 
form and consolidate. With few exceptions historians have not investigated why 
ordinary Athenians formed these perceptions.278 As a consequence much more 
research is required on the possible long-term factors behind this new imaginary. 
These include the growing worship of Athena as a city-protecting goddess, increasing 
economic prosperity, the perceived designs of neighbours on Attica and non-elite 
participation in the emerging legal and political institutions of the city.279 
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Although the new Athenian navy of early fifth century can no longer be taken as 
the direct cause of the democratic consolidation, the military hyperactivity of fifth-
century Athens is likely to have had an indirect and multifaceted impact on its 
political development. The two decades of fighting after the Persian Wars clearly 
affected the economy and society of Athens, probably causing political changes in 
turn.280 With imperial income the Athenians built the massive port facilities and hired 
the thousands of workmen which were required to maintain their warships. The needs 
and salaries of these ship-builders encouraged the development of secondary 
businesses, while the bringing in of ever-larger amounts of cargo to service this 
military-led expansion quickly made the Piraeus the busiest trading port of the 
eastern Mediterranean. New urban jobs in turn attracted large numbers of 
impoverished citizens from the countryside, making it easier for more citizens to 
attend the city-based meetings of the democracy.281 The sheer number of campaigns 
and the complex task of running a league greatly increased the volume of public 
business, forcing the convening of assembly- and council-meetings more regularly. 
Coming on top of the socio-economic changes, this intensification of politics 
presumably developed the democracy practically and ideologically. At the same time 
the regular political participation of large numbers of non-elite citizens is likely to 
have given the Athenian dmos the confidence and general knowledge to take further 
control of the city and its magistrates.  
 The likelihood of this indirect impact of war on democracy is clear enough but 
the long dominance of military determinism means no ‘comprehensive and well-
documented study’ of this democratic consolidation has ever been undertaken.282 
Likewise very few have paid any attention to the consolidation and reform of 
Athenian democratic institutions in the balance of the fifth century and throughout 
the next.283 Thus there remain significant opportunities for new research not only into 
the democratisation of Athens but also into the consolidation of the democracy and its 
subsequent institutional innovations throughout the classical period. In taking up 
these lines of enquiry ancient historians can draw on a rich body of political-science 
literature; for while they have generally shied away from the problem of democracy’s 
impact on war-making, since the so-called third wave of democratisation in the 1970s 
political scientists have studied systematically the preconditions for the emergence of 
modern democracies in different regions, the political and social actors in these 
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transitions, and the internal and external causes of democratic consolidation.284 
Drawing on such theory would enable ancient historians to test more easily the 
validity of the discipline-based or apparently common-sense assumptions which they 
would bring to this topic.285 It would also provide us with new hypotheses or help us 
improve pre-existing ones about Athenian democratisation and generally allow the 
development of explanations which go beyond the military determinism of our 
ancient sources.   
 
8. Ancient Athens as a Valuable Case for Political Science 
The interplay of democracy and foreign policy is of clear importance today. 
Established democracies face increasingly complex security challenges and are 
generally committed to the promotion of democracy worldwide. The United States 
and coalitions of its allies have deployed their armed forces to Afghanistan and Iraq 
ostensibly for the sake of democracy, while many first-world states individually or as 
part of the European Union continue to provide practical support for emerging 
democracies and the pro-democracy campaigners of non-democratic regimes.286 For 
example, the Australian government has sent soldiers, police and government 
advisors to East Timor and the Solomon Islands to shore up new democracies on the 
verge of internal collapse and helps train the politicians and public servants of 
neighbouring countries in parliamentary procedures, electioneering and public 
finance.287 The results of these democracy-promotion efforts are decidedly mixed. In 
Iraq and Afghanistan the United States and its allies have found it extremely difficult 
to forge the national cohesion and shared identity, which are commonly considered 
preconditions of democracy, and to prevent intense sectarian violence. The adoption 
of democracy-promotion by President Bush as the retrospective justification for the 
2003 invasion of Iraq has also exacerbated the backlash against democracy in the 
Middle East and further afield.288 The democracy-promotion efforts of Australia 
closer to home may be more successful but are indicative of the weakness of many 
neighbouring states, which are threatened by insubordinate militaries or not 
consolidated sufficiently. While there are good humanitarian and security reasons for 
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supporting these democracies, ‘Australia remains a long way from having a clear idea 
how to help our small weak neighbours build stable effective governments’.289 
At the same time established democracies face deepening problems internally, 
which threaten their long-term viability and their effectiveness at the making of 
policy.290 Contemporary voters display unprecedented levels of political apathy and 
disdain towards politicians and the operation of parliament. Growing numbers of 
young citizens are not registering to vote and the membership of political parties is in 
steep decline. In recent years these problems have been compounded by assertive 
executives, which have sought to stifle parliamentary scrutiny and discredit voices of 
criticism in civil society and the media.291 Since the open debates and electoral 
contests which underwrite the superiority of democratic decision-making require an 
actively engaged citizenry, the addressing of this ‘democratic deficit’ is a matter of 
some urgency.292 
A good way to deepen our thinking on these contemporary problems lies in the 
so-called lessons of history.293 The track records of past democracies can help us 
identify and test our own assumptions about democracy and war and suggest new 
ways for thinking about their interaction. Athens was of course smaller than an 
averaged-sized modern state and had a direct rather than representative democracy 
which was based on different social relations.294 These differences make it impossible 
to project conclusions about Athens directly onto contemporary affairs. On the other 
hand, this city-state had the only fully developed democracy of pre-modern times, 
whose richly documented history allows us to analyse its operation thoroughly. The 
canonical status of its drama and oratory means hundreds of its literary works have 
survived, while its so-called epigraphical habit of recording decrees on stone has 
given us a huge archive of its political activity.295 As a result, historians of what is by 
far the best documented community of the Greek world can undertake what Clifford 
Geertz famously described as ‘thick description’: we can give well rounded 
descriptions of Athenian politics and war over three centuries, test empirically a 
complex theory on their causal symbiosis, and detail the so-called causal mechanisms 
of proven hypotheses. Such a case study – as Comparative Politics shows – has great 
heuristic value for researchers. Proven explanations of Athenian democracy and war-
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making can be suggestive hypotheses for researching contemporary case studies and 
serve as a good point of comparison for identifying unique features of our own 
system of government. The relationship of Political Science to Ancient History then 
is not a one-way street: Athens can help build theory on modern democracies at war.  
 But Athens does more than stimulate better thinking and new lines of research 
on our political and security challenges: it has the potential to give us novel ways to 
try and address them. The poleis of classical Greece existed in a highly competitive 
international environment where political or military failure frequently resulted in a 
combination of regime-change, loss of independence, loss of territory and the not 
infrequent annihilation of entire communities.296 In this world Athens was clearly a 
runaway success: its democracy was more fully developed and longstanding than any 
other and largely avoided the stasis which destroyed so many democracies. Athens 
also outperformed others militarily: it dominated the eastern Mediterranean in the 
fifth century and remained a major regional power and military innovator in the next. 
Therefore its democratic institutions and practices were proven successes.  
Since the 1970s ancient historians have increasingly pointed this out: while 
rightly abhorring its patriarchy and chattel slavery, they have nonetheless suggested 
that the democracy of the Athenians provides us with well tested possibilities for 
addressing current political challenges.297 In treating Athens as a model for political 
reform they are of course following in the footsteps of George Grote.298 In recent 
years political scientists have taken up this suggestion: Athens is now seen as a good 
comparison for advancing our understanding of modern democracy, while its 
institutional inventions are treated as viable solutions to the problems of voter 
disengagement.299 Likewise, Athens should offer us possible solutions to our security 
challenges, even if its potential as a military model has been almost completely 
ignored.300 Thus by investigating how, for example, the open debates and general 
democratic design of classical Athens contributed to its military success, ancient 
historians could make available to political scientists and governmental policymakers 
thought-provoking alternatives and possible solutions to current security 
 
296 Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 87, 120-3; Hansen 2006a, 128.  
297 E.g. Balot 2006, 51-7; Euben, Wallach and Ober 1994; Farrar 2007, 184-9; Finley 1973; 
Ober and Hedrick 1996; Ober 2008a. Contra Osborne 1994. For discussions of this trend among 
ancient historians since the 1970s, see Demetriou 1998 with bibliography; Rhodes 2003, 50-2.  
298 Demetriou 2000, 272-3.  
299 E.g. Carson and Martin 1999, s.v. ‘Athens’; Manin 1997, 8-41; Schwartzberg 2004. 
300 An interesting exception are the increasing numbers of democratic-peace-theory-
proponents who recognise that the Hellenic city-state system was ‘the only other well documented 
state system with a larger number of democratic regimes’ (Russett and Antholis 1992, 415) and 
hence can be used as a valuable point of comparison for developing their theory; see, for example, 
Robinson 2001; 2006; Russett 2009; Russett and Antholis 1992; Weart 2001.  
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challenges.301 Admittedly these conceptual and practical contributions of Athens to 
the modern world may be modest. However, in light of the relative lack of 
scholarship on democracy and war in any period of world history and the complexity 
of the foreign-policy challenges we face, they will undoubtedly be valuable. 302 
301 Pritchard 2006. 
302 Early drafts of this chapter were delivered as papers, in 2009, at the second conference of 
the International Society for Cultural History, which was convened by the University of 
Queensland; in 2007, at the Australian National University, the University of Melbourne and the 
Lebanese American University (Beirut) and for the Sydney Democracy Forum at the University of 
Sydney; in 2006, at the War, Culture and Democracy in Classical Athens Conference, convened by 
the University of Sydney; the Institute for Classical Studies (London) and Columbia University; 
and, in 2005, at the twenty-sixth conference of the Australasian Society for Classical Studies, 
conveyed by the University of Otago, the University of Wales (Swansea), the University of 
Cambridge and Nagoya University. I am grateful for the helpful comments of the audience-
members. For their valuable comments on early drafts or generous responses to my questions 
special thanks go to Ryan Balot, Jumana Bayeh, Alastair Blanshard, Hugh Bowden, Lyn Carson, 
Eric Csapo, Michael Edwards, Vincent Gabrielsen, Graeme Gill, Margaret Harris, Christopher 
Hilliard, Christopher Hobson, Ian Hunter, John Keane, Josiah Ober, Robin Osborne, Kurt A. 
Raaflaub, P.J. Rhodes, Vincent Rosivach, Bruce Russett, Henk Singor, Iain Spence, Martin Stone, 
the late Robert Tannebaum, Hans van Wees and Sumio Yoshitake. I would also like to 
acknowledge the research assistance of Atticus Cox and Todd Gillen. An earlier version of four 
parts of this chapter was published as Pritchard 2007. The translations of the Greek are my own.  
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